Statistical Power of Psychological Research: The Artifactual Basis of Controversial Results by Rossi, Joseph S.
University of Rhode Island 
DigitalCommons@URI 
Open Access Dissertations 
1984 
Statistical Power of Psychological Research: The Artifactual Basis 
of Controversial Results 
Joseph S. Rossi 
University of Rhode Island 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/oa_diss 
Recommended Citation 
Rossi, Joseph S., "Statistical Power of Psychological Research: The Artifactual Basis of Controversial 
Results" (1984). Open Access Dissertations. Paper 962. 
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/oa_diss/962 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more 
information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu. 
STATISTICAL POWER OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH: 
THE ARTIFACTUAL BASIS OF CONTROVERSIAL RESULTS 
BY 
JOSEPHS. ROSSI 
A oissE RTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
BEQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
. IN 
PSYCHOLOGY 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
1984 
ABSTRACT 
The statistical power of psychological research was 
examined in three studies. The purpose of Study I was to 
provide a general assessment of statistical power in 
psychological research. All of the studies using 
statistical tests in the 1982 issues of the Jollnal of 
Abnormal Psychology and the Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology (N = 142) were evaluated and compared to 
the results of a previous surv e y. Results indicated that 
the power of psychological research has increased over the 
past 20 years but that power must still be characterized as 
low. These results are limited because accurate estimates 
of effect size, on which power analysis must be based, are 
not given in most research reports. The purpose of Studies 
I I and III was to use recently devised techniques of 
me ta-analysis to provide estimates of effect size for 
s ubsequent power analyses. Use of this procedure allowed 
po wer analyses to be conducted using precise estimates of 
effect size, rather than a wide range of effect sizes, as 
i n previous power surveys. In study II, a meta-analysis of 
48 studies on the spontaneous recovery of verbal learning 
was conducted. This area of r e search was selected be cause 
p revious studies of spontaneou s recovery have produced 
c onflicting results concerning the e xistence of the 
phenomenon. Results indicated that th e evidence for 
spontaneous recovery is statistically significant, but that 
t he magnitude of the effect is s mall. A. powe r analysis was 
then performed on the spontaneous recovery studies using 
the effect size information obtained by the meta-analysis. 
Results indicated that the power of research on spontaneous 
recovery was lov, and implied that contradictory findings 
may be an artifact of low statistical power. This 
implication was examined in Study III. Power analyses were 
conducted on each of 12 published meta-analyses, all of 
which had been performed on research literatures 
characterized by inconsistent results. The results of 
Study II were generally confirmed. For six of the 
meta-analyses statistical power was similar to the 
proportion of significant ~esults. In only three of the 
meta-analyses was power relatively high (> .75), while for 
the remaining meta-analyses power was very low (< .55). 
The low power of these research areas is due to the small size 
of the effects that were investigated. Average effect size 
(eta2) across all meta-analyses was only .019. For effects of 
this magnitude only very large sample sizes will yield 
acceptable levels of statistical power (e.g., .80). It is 
recommended, therefore, that psychologists increase power by 
making effect sizes larger, that i s by increasing th e 
signal-to-noise ratio of research designs. Ultimately 
desirable is the construction of "strong" th e ories, which 
would enable researchers to make specific prediction s 
concerning the magnitudes of the effects they study. 
DEDICATION 
To my parents 
For lighting the spark of my curiosity so many years ago. 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First, I'd like to acknowledge the time, advice, and 
friendship of my committee members: Dr. Charles Collyer, Dr. 
Peter Merenda, Dr. Janet Kulberg, Dr. Choudary Hanumara, 
Dr. Susan Brady and Dr. Ray Hurley. I'd especially like to 
thank Dr. Collyer and Dr. Merenda for their patience with my 
slow progress: their help and friendship has meant a great 
deal to me. Beyond their help on my research, they have 
taught me what psychology is all about. Although not a 
committee member, Dr. Wayne Velicer has also been a friend and 
mentor throughout my graduate career. The friendship of many 
of my fellow students has made graduate school a truly 
worthwhile experience. Especially I'd like to thank Dr. Pat 
Se ymour, Dr. Kathi O'Neill, Or. Sandy Neill, Sally Cottrill, 
Ed Guadagnoli, Dr. Steven Ginpil, and Dr. Gene Heitz. I'd 
also like to thank Sally Cottrill for helping in the 
collection of data for Study I. My deepest and most lasting 
appreciation goes to my wife Sue. She participated in data 
collection for Study I, typed large portions of the original 
draft manuscript, and has single-handedly prepared the final 
version of the manuscript, which reguired her to learn a new 
computer system under considerable time pressure. Most of 
all, she had to put up ~ith me while my concerns seemed 
focused almost entirely on my work. He r efforts and sacri f ice 
have made it pos s ible. 
V 
PREFACE 
It often happens in science that the actual conduct of 
research is not as orderly and straightforward as the 
presentation of the results might suggest. The research 
presented here is no exception. study II was conducted 
first. As a result of a seminar on human learning and 
memory I wrote a paper reviewing the literature on the 
spontaneous recovery of verbal associations (Rossi, 1977). 
The experience left me puzzled: why should so many 
well-designed studies fail to produce a clear consensus 
among researchers? I concluded, with the majority of 
reviewers, that spontaneous recovery did not exist, or if 
it did, that it was too ephemeral to be meaningful. I 
first became aware of the techniques of meta-analysis 
several years later. Here, it seemed, was a guantitative 
means of demonstrating spontaneous recovery's lack of 
robustness. Instead, the statistical evidence for the 
effect emerged strongly. Only when the small magnitude of 
the effect was revealed did I begin to suspect the role 
statistical power might play in generating controversy 
among researchers. Study III followed naturally since by 
1982 a sufficient number of studies had been published to 
make a power analysis of meta-analyses a feasible project. 
Study I was conceived last, almost as an afterthought 
since, as I have exp1ained to friends, "I needed an EPA 
paper for 1984 to justify going to Baltimore and eating 
vi 
crab cakes for four days." Study I was then included in 
the dissertation since it seemed an appropriate prelude to 
Studies II and III. Portions of all three studies have 
been presented at professional conferences: study I at the 
55th Annual Meeting of the Eastern Psychological 
Association, Baltimore, MD, April 1984; Study II at the 
53rd Annual Meeting of the Eastern Psychological 
Association, Baltimore, MD, April 1982; Study III at the 
54th Annual Meeting of the Eastern Psychological 
Association, Philadelphia, PA, April 1983; and portions of 
all three studies at the 150th National Meeting of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, New 
York, NY, Kay 1984. 
31 May 1984 
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Researchers in the behavioral sciences often depend 
upon statistical inference in order to decide whether or 
not an experimental effect is present. Since, as a result 
of an experimental manipulation, an effect will either be 
present or not present, and because the results of a 
statistical test will either support or reject the null 
hypothesis of no effect, there are four possible outcomes 
in any experimental situation (see Table 1). 
Table 1 







State of the Population 
Effect Absent 
'Iype I Error 
{p = alpha) 
Correct Decision 
(p = 1 - alpha) 
Ef feet Present 
Power 
(p = 1 - beta) 
Type II Error 
(p = beta) 
1. There is no effect, but the statistical test 
decision is to reject the null hypothesis. This is a type 
I error and it occurs with probability alpha. 
2. There is no effect and the statistical test decision 
1 
is to accept the null hypothesis. This correct decision 
occurs with probability 1 - a l ph~. 
3. An effect is present, but the statistical test 
decision is to not reject the null hypothesis. This is a 
type II error and it occurs with probability beta. 
4~ An effect is present, and the statistical test 
decision is to reject the null hypothesis. This correct 
decision occurs with probability 1 - beta. 
Closely related to the correct rejection of the null 
hypothesis (and often equated with it) is the co nc e pt of 
statistical power. The power of a statistical test is the 
pro b ability that the test will yield statistica ll y 
significant results. Three factors determine the 
statistical power of an experiment. 
1. Significance level: Power increases as a 
researcher's willingness to accept a type I error 
increases. This factor includes the related issue of 
directional vs. nondirectional tests. While directional 
tests are (or were) considered somewhat controversial 
(e.g., Burke, 1953, 1954; Eysenck, 1960; Goldfried, 
1959; Jones, 1952, 1954; Kaiser, 1960), they are 
nevertheless more powerful than nondirectional tests. 
2. Sample size: Power increases as sample size 
2 
increases. 
3. Effect size: Power increases as the magnitude of the 
effect being studied increases. 
Since the aim of behavioral research is to discover 
important relationships between variables, a consideration 
of power might be regarded as a natural and important part 
of the planning and interpretation of research. Cohen 
(1977) has expressed the point aptly: "Since statistical 
significance is so earnestly sought and devoutly wished for 
by behavioral scientists, one would think that the a priori 
probability of its accomplishment would be routinely 
determined and well understood" (p. 1). This seems not to 
be the case among behavioral researchers even though a 
routine consideration of power may have several beneficial 
conseguences. 
1. Most directly, of course, a knowledge of the power 
of a statistical test gives an indication of the likelihood 
of obtaining statistically significant results. 
Presumably, most researchers would not knowingly conduct an 
investigation of low statistical power (e.g., 1 - beta< 
.50) · unless there were absolutely no alternative (one might 
always get lucky, after all!). If a priori power estimates 
are low, the researcher may elect to increase power by 
manipulating one or more of the three factors listed 
3 
previously. Alternatively, the researcher may decide to 
abandon the proposed research altogether if the costs of 
increasing power are too high, or if the costs of 
conducting research of low power cannot be justified. 
2. Knowledge of the power of a statistical test greatly 
facilitates the interpretation of null results. It is 
often stressed in statisics textbooks, though seldom 
adhered to in practice, that the failure to reject the null 
hypothesis does not require the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis, that is, does not constitute evidence that the 
null hypothesis is true. The most that can generally be 
claimed in this situation is that there is not sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis. However, if the 
power of the test is known to be high, then failure to 
reject the null hypothesis can in a sense be considered as 
an affirmation of the null hypothesis. This follows from 
the fact that if power is high, then the probability of a 
type II error must be low. Thus, in the same way that a 
statistically significant result allows a ·researcher to 
confidently reject the null hypothesis with only a small 
probability of error (alpha), high statistical power 
affords a researcher the luxury of accepting the null 
hypothesis with a relatively small probability of error 
4 
(beta). If statistical power is low, one is no worse off 
than before, and can furthermore assert that there was not 
a fair chance of rejecting the null hypothesis, so that 
failure to reject may not weigh so heavily against the 
alternative hypothesis (the "alibi" use of power). Both of 
the lines of reasoning put forth here have limits, of 
course, and these limits have to do with the concept of 
"effect size," which will be more fully explained in 
Chapter 2. 
3. Beyond considerations of individual research 
results, attention to statistical power may provide insight 
concerning entire research domains. In particular, when 
low statistical power characterizes an entire research 
literature, then the veracity of even statistically 
significant results may be questioned. This follows from 
the fact that when power is low the probability of 
rejecting a true null hypothesis may be only slightly 
smaller than the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis when the alternative is true. Thus, a large 
proportion of published significant results may be type I 
errors. This point will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 3. 
This brief survey of the value of power analysis raises 
the question of why behavioral researchers ignore an issue 
5 
of such clear and obvious merit. Indeed, the benefits of a 
routine consideration of statistical power may strike some 
readers as almost too good to be true. Nevertheless, it is 
probably not an exaggeration to assert that most behavioral 
researchers know little more about statistical power than 
its definition. It will certainly surprise no one to claim 
that, historically, behavioral researchers have been 
primarily concerned with the type I error and the 
associated concept of the "significance" of a statistical 
test and have largely ignored the type II error and its 
concomitant, the power of a statistical test (Eakan, 1966; 
Chase 6 Tucker, 1976; Cohen, 1977; Cowles & Davis, 1982b; 
Hogben, 1957). 
The result has been that, while the concept of 
statistical significance is well-known in psychology, that 
of statistical power is not. The latter concept has been 
known to mathematical statisticians for a long time, and 
was introduced in a famous series of papers by Neyman and 
Pearson (1928a, 1928.b, 1933a, 1933b, 1936a, 1936b, 1938, 
1967). Their aim was to develop a sound mathematical 
theory of statistical hypothesis testing. In so doing 
Neyman and Pearson introduced such now familiar concepts as 
power, confidence intervals, and type I and type II errors. 
6 
(It is true, however, that others had already recognized 
the importance of the two types of errors in making 
statistical decisions. Perhaps ·the earliest was Condorcet 
late in the eighteenth century (Taylor, 1959).) 
One major impetus to the development of the Neyman-
" 
Pearson theory was the asymmetry in the traditional 
approach to statistical inference. In formulating the null 
hypothesis, Fisher established no specific alternative 
hypothesis. No particular problem results from this 
approach if the statistical test is significant: the 
researcher simply concludes that the effect being studied 
is not zero, that is, that the e ffect is present. 
The asymmetry aris es when the statistical test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis. Under these circumstances it 
is not possible to conclude that there is no effect 
(although just such a conclusion is often made--implicitly 
if not explicitly--in the discussion of results by 
researchers), only that there is no evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis. This follows directly from the Fisherian 
procedure of not stating an alternative hypothesis. From 
the Fisherian viewpoint, the R value associated with a 
statistical test represented the confidence with which one 
could reject the null hypothesis. Thus, the traditional 
interpretation of the classical significance test concerned 
7 
the validity of the null hypothesis, as revealed by the 
obtained results. A~ value of .01 meant simply that there 
was only one chance in 100 that the null hypothesis was 
valid. This retrospective interpretation of the null 
hypothesis in probabilistic terms has been called the 
"Backward Look" (Hogben, 1957) • There was no specific 
mention or appreciation of alpha levels or type I errors, 
nor of course, of type II errors (Bakan, 1966; Chase & 
Tucker, 1976; Cohen, 1977: Hogben, 1957; Taylor, 1959). 
While Fisher seems to ~ave generally preferred a 
significance level of .05, he did not maintain that a 
particular level of significance be specified prior to the 
collection of data. Although this may now seem to be an 
odd practice, it is not particularly surprising given that, 
for Fisher, the interpretation of results was 
retrospective. In contrast, the Neyman-Pearson approach to 
hypothesis testing demanded the a priori specification of 
significance level, that is, of alpha, since in the 
Neyman-Pearson approach, hypothesis testing did not 
constitute a retrospective evaluation of the null 
hypothesis, but rather was an expectation of future 
outcomes. No single experimental result can determine the 
validity of the null hypothesis. The fate of the null 
8 
depends instead on the outcome of future experiments. This 
was the "Forward Look" (Hogben, 1957), and though the 
difference between this approach and that of the "Backward 
Look" may appear subtle and of philosophical interest only, 
it was the occasion of much acrimony in the 1930's, 
especially among British statisticians (Bakan, 1966; Hogben, 
1957; Pearson, 1970; Reid, 1982; Taylor, 1959). 
The critical step taken by Neyman and Pearson was the 
proposal to use a specific alternative hypothesis, that is, 
one in which the expected departure from null is explicitly 
stated. This step enabled them to think in terms of both 
the confidence with which the null hypothesis could be 
rejected (which they called the type I error probability) 
and the confidence with which the null hypothesis could be 
accepted. The Neyman-Pearson approach also enabled the 
researcher to state in advance the probability of 
incorrectly accepting the null hypothesis (which they 
called the type II error probability) and the probability 
of correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis, that is, to 
state in advance the pover of a statistical test. Thus, it 
is the Neyman-Pearson approach to hypothesis testing which 
has resulted in the modern conception of the possible 
outcomes of the experimental situation shown in Table 1. 
The relationships shown in Table 1 are, of course, well 
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known to behavioral researchers, since they are included in 
most introductory statistics textbooks. Unfortunately, 
most behavioral researchers are exposed to little more than 
what is presented in such texts. Coverage is more 
extensive in graduate-level handbooks (e.g., Glass & 
Stanley, 1970; Hays, 1981; Ke ppel, 1982; Winer, 1971'), 
though rarely runs to more than a few pages. Even so, 
discussion is usually limited to the power of the t test 
and one-way analysis of variance. Issues of power as 
related to more complex designs and to more sophisticated 
statistical techniques--such as factorial, repeated 
measures, and multivariate designs, and nonparametric 
methods--are to be found only in the technical journal 
literature or in textbooks of mathematical statistics, both 
of which are likely to be inaccessible to the majority of 
behavioral researchers. 
Few general handbooks of statistical power are 
available. Odeh and Fox (1975) is appropriate for 
statistical tests arising from the general linear model, 
but their procedures are probably more complicated than 
most behavioral scientists would be willing to tolerate. 
Furthermore, their charts are designed primarily for the 
determination of sample size, and are not easily adapted to 
10 
estimating power. Mace (1964) was intended primarily for 
engineers and seems to be unknown to psychologists, 
although many of the techniques included in this text are 
used in behavioral research. Sample size calculations are 
its main intent, although formulas for determining power 
are included. 
Cohen's (1969, 1977) te~t remains the only one devoted 
entirely to statistical power analysis written specifically 
for behavioral researchers. Extensive tables (over 60 
pages devoted to the analysis of variance alone) are 
included for both sample size and power determination. 
Included are chapter length considerations of the following 
statistical tests:! test, Pearson r, ~ test for 
differences between correlation coefficients, sign test and 
the test that a proportion is .50, ~ test for differences 
between proportions, chi-square test for goodness-of-fit 
and for contingency tables,! test in the analysis of 
variance and covariance, and (in Cohen, 1977, only} 1 test 
in multiple regression/correlation analysis. Power values 
are given for a wide range of sample sizes and effect sizes 
and for three levels of alpha (.01, .05, .10). The tabled 
values are given to two decimal places and are accurate to 
about one digit in the last decimal place when compared to 
exact values (e.g., Tang, 1938). A technical appendix 
11 
provides computational formulas for the calculation of 
power and sample size for most of the statistical tests 
covered. 
Cohen's (1962, 1965, 1969, 1977) discussions of 
statistical power were not the first aimed at the general 
community of psychological researchers (e.g., Mosteller & 
Bush, 1954). Nevertheless, it has been Cohen's work more 
than any other which has been largely responsible for what 
increase in interest in power among behavioral researchers 
has occurred over the past 20 years (e.g., Cowles, 1974; 
Hinkle & Oliver, 1983; Koele, 1982; Levine & Dunlap, 1982; 
Lipsey, 1983; Medler, Schneider, & schneider, 1981; Sacco, 
1982; Schwartz & Dalgleish, 1982; Trattner & C'Leary, 1980; 
Westermann & Hager, 1983). 
Summary 
Statistical power depends on three factors: significance 
level, sample size and effect size. The basic concept of 
statistical power, as embodied in the four-fold decision 
matrix of test outcome (see !able 1), is well-known to 
behavioral researchers. Nevertheless, routine use of 
statistical power in the planning and interpretation of 
research is not a common practice among psychologists. This 
is unfortunate, since consideration of power not only 
12 
provides an indication of the likelihood of obtaining 
statistically significant results, but also greatly 
facilitates the interpretation of null results. 
There are undoubtedly many reasons why psychological 
researchers do not devote more attention to issues of 
statistical power. Journal editors must ultimately bear 
some of the responsibility, but until the appearance of 
Cohen's (1969, 1977) handbook no convenient introduction to 
the topic of power was available. Coverage of statistical 
power in most of the graduate-level texts used by 
psychologists has been perfunctory at best. Detailed 
treatment of power has, of course, always been available in 
the journal literature, especially of mathematical 
statistics, but seems not to have "trickled down" to 
behavioral researchers to any great extent. The problem 
here probably has a great deal to do with the concept of 
effect size. The role of effect size, and why it bas been 
a barrier to the use of statistical power, will be 
discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, one encouraging recent 
development may be noted: that is the inclusion in several 
introductory textbooks of entire chapters on power analysis 
(Hovell, 1982; Jaccard, 1983; ~inium & Clarke, 1982; 
Welkowitz, Ewen, & Cohen, 1982). 
13 
CHAPTER 2 
The Role of Effect Size in Statistical Power Analysis 
One major factor contributing to the widespread 
disinterest in statistical power among behavioral 
scientists is the concomitant disinterest in and ignorance 
of effect size statistics. The magnitude of the effect 
under investigation may be thought of as an index of the 
extent to which the null hypothesis is not valid. The 
departure from null, called the noncentrality parameter in 
the technical literature, is one of three factors upon 
which the power of a statistical test depends. 
Significance level and sample size are under the direct 
control of the experimenter. Significance level is 
strongly constrained by convention at no greater than alpha 
= .05, so that the experimenter's control here is largely 
illusory. The major constraint on sample size is generally 
one of time and money (one rarely encounters a researcher 
who complains of having too many subjects and too much time 
or money). These two factors are often restrictions on 
increasing the power of an experiment. However, since both 
factors must be addressed by researchers before their 
research can be initiated, neither significance level nor 
sample size can be barriers to the routine consideration of 
14 
experimental power. 
The role of effect size is fundamentally different. 
This factor is not under the control of the researcher. In 
fact, the magnitude of the effect being studied is usually 
unknown to the researcher, its determination often being 
the primary reason for which the research is conducted (at 
least to the extent that the effect may be said to exist or 
not exist). This may seem to be a problem for power 
analysis, but is really only a problem when an investigator 
is researching a totally new phenomenon, an unlikely 
circumstance for behavioral research (and by some accounts, 
for science in general (Kuhn, 1970)). 
For most behavioral research there is generally enough 
previous related research to enable the investigator to 
estimate effect size reasonably, at least for the purposes 
of providing a preliminary estimate of experimental power. 
Yet, this is not done, primarily for two reasons: (a) 
Estimates of effect size are rarely explicitly stated in 
published research (Cohen, 1965, 1977: Cowles, 1977; Craig, 
Eison, & 8etze, 1976; Haase, Waechter, & Solomon, 1982; 
Katzer & Sodt, 1973); and (b) Most behavioral researchers 
do not know how to calculate effect size from the kinds of 
data which are included in published reports. Furthermore, 
many published reports do not include sufficient data to 
15 
enable even the motivated reader to calculate the obtained 
effect size (Katzer 6 Sodt, 1973). These two problems will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next two sections. 
Why Effect sizes are not Reported 
--------------------------------Why are effect sizes not included in research reports? 
Slavish adherence to the significance testing routine in 
conjunction with ignorance of the appropriate computational 
procedures for determining effect size undoubtedly explains 
much. Particularly revealing is that many of the standard 
computer packages do not include effect size estimates 
among the default output (or even as options in some cases) 
for the most popular univariate statistics, such as 
Student's 1 test and the analysis of variance. For 
example, omega2--the most widely recommended measure of 
effect size for the analysis of variance--is not provided 
as output on analysis of variance programs provided by any 
of the three major statistical packages: BMDP (Dixon, 
1981), SAS (Ray, 1982), and SPSS (SPSSX User's Guide, 
1983). (SAS does provide R2 (which is equal to eta 2) as 
output, a reflection of its general linear model approach 
to the analysis of variance.) 
so much has been written in the last 25 years 
concerning the shortcomings of using the probability value 
16 
of a significance test as an index of effect size that it 
seems pointless to €laborate further (Bakan, 1966; Carver, 
1978; Cohen, 1965, 1977; Cook, Gruder, Hennigan, & Flay, 
1979; Lykken, 1968; Meehl, 1967, 1978; Morrison & Henkel, 
1970; Rozeboom, 1960; Wilson, Miller, & Lower, 1967). The 
most serious limitation, of course, is the dependence of 
significance level on sample size, so that the level of 
significance ma y be increased arbitrarily by adding 
observations. More likely to be forgotten is that the 
level of significance the researcher may claim depends on 
the alpha level set prior to the collection of data (Shine, 
1980). At any rate, it i s probably true that many 
researchers still equate significance le ve l with the impact 
and importance of a treatment effect (Be a uchamp & May, 1964; 
Cooper & Rosenthal, 1980; Meehl, 1978; Rosenthal & Gaito, 
1963, 1964). 
Even less charitable, perhaps, is th e suggestion that 
effect size information may be suppressed in many research 
reports. Thus, a correlation of .45, in the context of a 
validity coefficient, may appear guite substantial. 
However, to discuss the relationship in terms of proportion 
of variance accounted for, and especially in terms of 
proportion of variance not accounted for (here about 80%) 
would undoubtedly diminish the .magnitude of the 
17 
relationship in the minds of many readers. 
Perhaps due to the ease of conversion from correlation 
coefficient to effect size measure (proportion of variance 
accounted for), those areas of behavioral research heavily 
invested in correlational methods seem more inclined to 
discuss results in terms of measures of association and 
seem to rely less on significance testing. Of greater 
concern is the widespread disavowal of correlational 
methods by researchers using experimental designs. 
Although this problem was ~oted many years ago in a classic 
paper by Cronbach (1957), little seems to have c hanged 
since. The problem is compounde d here in that t he popular 
analytic technigues (t test and analysis of varian ce) are 
not as easily transformed into an effect size estim a te as 
are correlation coefficients. Certainly, t(100) = 3.0, ~ < 
.01 suggests a more successful experimental outcome than 
its equivalent, omega 2 = .07, which reveals that more than 
90% of the variance in the dependent variable has not been 
accounted for by the experimental manipulation. 
The situation is charged with irony. For example, the 
computational effort required to determine the proportion 
of variance accounted for in a! test or analysis of 
variance is a great deal less than for the significance 
18 
test itsel£! For the! test, the relationship is simply 
omega2 = (t2 - 1) / (t2 + .!f - 1) , (1) 
where! is the total sample size {Hays, 1963). The 
relationship is even simpler for another popular proportion 
of variance statistic, eta2: 
eta2 = t2 / (t2 + df) , (2) 
where df represents the degrees of freedom associated with 
the significance test (Kerlinger, 1964). 
Concerning the rift between the "two disciplines of 
scientific psychology" (Cronbach, 1957), it is perhaps 
sufficient to note that the analysis of variance and 
regression/correlation methods--far from being different 
techniques--both arise from the general linear model 
(Cohen, 1968i Cohen & Cohen, 1983). As Haggard (1958) has 
aptly noted, most significance tests may be thought of as 
ratios of controlled plus uncontrolled variance to 
uncontrolled variance, to test whether controlled variance 
is greater than would be expected by chance. Measures of 
association may be thought of as the ratio of controlled 
variance to total variance (controlled plus uncontrolled). 
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The similarity between significance tests and measures of 
association is thus greater than most behavioral 
researchers may recognize. The differences between these 
measures reflect the different questions each was designed 
to answer. Further irony is added when it is noted that 
the analysis of variance was developed specifically out of 
Fisher's (1924, 1925) consideration of intraclass 
correlation (Haggard, 1958; Rucci & Tweney, 1980; Taylor, 
1959) • 
Perhaps most ironic of all is the concern some 
researchers may have that reporting measures of association 
will debase their findings. The root of this concern is 
probably the lack of a standard by which to measure the 
magnitude of effect size. In contrast to the situation for 
significance level, there are no traditional guidelines for 
judging an effect as large or small. Of course, to some 
extent this merely reflects the very real differences in 
the problems studied and methods used in a discipline as 
diverse as psychology. In laboratory fields such as 
psychophysics, a researcher might well be discouraged if no 
more than 80-90% of the variance could be accounted for. 
The ability of the investigator to fine-tune the parameters 
of the research greatly increases expectations about effect 
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size. In such research the significance test itself is 
sometimes not necessary. 
The majority of research areas in psychology are not so 
fortunate, especially when only weak manipulations are used 
(where stronger manipulations might not be possible or 
ethically permissable), or where manipulation may not be 
possible at all (that hallmark of much current 
psychological research--gender--comes most readily to 
mind). That the magnitude of effect in such research is 
likely to be small is probably recognized by most 
researchers (e.g., Hyde, 1981; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; 
Rossi, 1983). But how small is a "small" effect? The 
irony · here is that the reluctance of researchers to report 
measures of association has effectively masked the fact 
that effect sizes in most areas of psychological research 
are astoundingly small. 
Very few surveys of the effect sizes obtained in 
published research have been conducted. The most extensive 
survey analysed 701 studies and 11044 statistical tests 
published between 1970 and 1979 in the Journal of 
Counseling Psychology (Haase, Waechter, & Solomon, 1982). 
The median proportion of variance accounted for (eta 2 ) was 
.0830. Brown (1975) conducted a similar, but more limited 
survey of studies published in the American Educational 
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Research Journal from 1970 to 1974. Only correlation 
coefficients were recorded (N = ~69); median r 2 was .051. 
Several other surveys have found somewhat larger average 
effect sizes, but all were based on very limited data, 
generally less than 100 statistical tests (Cooper 6 
Findley, 1982; Craig, Eison, & Metze, 1976; Hamblin, 1971; 
Katzer & Sodt, 1973). These figures represent quite modest 
degrees of association and many researchers react with 
considerable surprise when informed that the average effect 
size in psychological research might be only of this 
magnitude. That this is not commonly appreciated is, of 
course, due to the fact that effect size is infrequently 
reported. 
Availability of Information on Effect size 
------------------------------------------
The availability of information on effect size 
statistics closely resembles the situation for power 
analysis in general. This is not surprising given the 
intimate relationship between these two issues. Most 
introductory statistics textbooks for students in the 
behavioral sciences contain little or no information on the 
meaning or calculation of effect size statistics, except 
for the sguared correlation coefficient r 2 • The situation 
h.as scarcely been any better in graduate level textbooks 
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until, with a few exceptions (e.g., Hays, 1963), quite 
recently (Hovell, 1982; Keppel, 1982; Kirk, 1982). 
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This situation has developed despite the fact that many 
writers in the journal literature have emphasized the 
necessity of reporting measures of effect size as an aid to 
interpreting tests of significance (Bakan, 1966; Cohen, 1965; 
Cowles, 1977; Dunnett, 1966; Fleiss, 1969; Halderson & 
Glasnapp, 1972; Lykken, 1968; Vaughan & Corballis, 1969). 
This attention seems to have resulted in a surfeit of 
effect size indices, causing perhaps more confusion than 
anything else. The most important of these will be 
discussed in turn, including various proportion of variance 
statistics, noncentrality parameters, and several of 
Cohen's effect size indices. Several other infrequently 
utilized measures will not be discussed, including 
Friedman's (1968, 1969, 1982; Breen & Gaito, 1970) 
procedures, coefficients of utility (Bolles & Messick, 1958; 
Gaito, 1958; Gaito & Firth, 1973), nonparametric measures 
(Kramer & Andrews, 1982; Krauth, 1983; Serlin, Carr, & 
Harascuilo, 1982; Stavig & Acock, 1980; Strahan, 1982), and 
multivariate measures (Cramer & Nicewander, 1979; Huberty, 
1983; Levy, 1967; sachdeva, 1973; serlin, 1982; Shaffer & 
Gillo, 1974) • 
Proportion of variance statistics. Measures of 
association have had a long history in experimental 
research (Glass & Hakstian, 1969). Perhaps the most 
popular have been the "proportion of variance" statistics: 
eta2, epsilon2, omega2, and intraclass correlation. All 
are ostensibly measures of the proportion of variance in 
the dependent variable that can be accounted for by the 
manipulation (or levels) of the independent variable. 
Alternatively, the proportion of variance accounted for may 
be thought of as the proportionate reduction in 
"uncertainty" (error variance) in the dependent variable 
that is afforded by a knowledge of the independent variable 
(Hays, 1963). Computationally, the measures are guite 
similar, so that for most practical situations all yield 
essentially the same results. The small differences 
between these measures reflect the different contexts 
within which each was developed. 
Eta 2 is sometimes referred to as the correlation ratio, 
and as previously mentioned is equal to the R2 statistic of 
multiple regression. Both eta2 and intraclass correlation 
were developed early in the century (i.e., before the 
development of the analysis of variance) in response to 
problems arising from Pearson's product-moment correlation 
coefficient (Haggard, 1958; Harris, 1913; Pearson, 1911). 
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Fisher (1924) first used them in connection with the 
analysis of variance, but neither was much used in 
behavioral research. 
In the past 25 years both etaz and intraclass 
correlation have been used increasingly in connection with 
the analysis of variance, particularly eta 2 • Once used 
primarily as a measure of nonlinear correlation (Ghiselli, 
Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981; Nunnally, 1978; Winer, 1971), 
eta2 has become one of the most popular measures of effect 
size for the analysis of variance (e.g., Cohen, 1973a; 
Friedman, 1968; Haase, 1983; Kennedy, 1970; Kerlinger, 
1964). Despite exhortations to the contrary (Haggard, 
1958), intraclass correlation is rarely used except as a 
measure of the reliability of ratings (Bartko, 1966, 1974, 
1976; Lahey, Downey, & Saal, 1983; Shrout 6 Fleiss, 1979). 
Recent textbook treatments of intraclass correlation 
reinforce this notion (Hays, 1981; Kerlinger, 1973; Winer, 
1971) • 
Both epsilon 2 and omega2 were developed specifically as 
measures of association within the context of the analysis 
of variance. Furthermore, while eta 2 is a descriptive 
(sample) statistic, both epsilon2 and omega2 were developed 
as inferential techniques. Kelly (1935) proposed epsilon 2 
as an unbiased alternative to eta2. It was, however, not 
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completely successful in its stated purpose. At first 
popularized by Peters and van Voorhis (1940), epsilon 2 was 
soon criticized by Lindguist (1953) and was never generally 
accepted. 
Perhaps the first index of effect size to gain some 
popularity among psychologists was omega 2 (Hays, 1963). 
Omega2 and epsilon 2 are almost exactly identical 
computationally, although Hays (1963) seems not to have 
been aware of the earlier work. For the completely random 
effects model, omega 2 and intraclass correlation become 
identical. 
Unlike epsilon 2 , omega2 has received considerable 
attention, and detailed guidelines for its determination in 
various ANOYA designs (including factorial and repeated 
measures designs, and fixed, random, and mixed model 
designs) have been published in the most popular behavioral 
journals (e.g., Charter, 1982; Dodd & Schultz, 1973; Dwyer, 
1974; Pleiss, 1969; Gaebelein, Soderquist, & Powers, 1976; 
Balderson & Glasnapp, 1972; Keren & Lewis, 1979; Susskind & 
Howland, 1980; Vaughan & Corballis, 1969). Nevertheless, 
coverage of omega2 in graduate-level textbooks has been 
almost nonexistent until recently (Howell, 1982; Keppel, 
1982; Kirk, 1982). Winer (1971), for example, does not 
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mention omega2 at all. coverage in undergraduate texts is 
likewise rare, but has become more frequent in recent years 
for both omega2 and eta2 (e.g., Jaccard, 1983; Keppel & 
saufley, 1980; Plutchik, 1983). Thus, it is not suprising 
that omega 2 is still reported infrequently in published 
research (Craig, Eison, & Metze, 1976). 
More detailed comparison of all four proportion of 
variance statistics may be found in camp and Maxwell 
(1983), Glass and Hakstian (1969), and Maxwell, Camp, and 
Arvey (1981). 
Noncentrality p arameters. One reason for the neglect 
of proportion of variance statistics by behavioral 
researchers may be that t hese measures have been ignored by 
mathematical statisticians as well. Fisher (1921, 1922, 
1924, 1928) and others (e.g., Wishart, 1932) did much of 
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the early work on the sampling distributions of intraclass 
correlation and etaz. Research in this area is less 
frequent now (Carroll & Faden, 1978; Fleishman, 1980; Ranney 
& Thigpen, 1981). Moreover, very little is known of 
the sampling characteristics of epsilon2 and omega 2 
(Carroll & Nordholm, 1975; Demorest, 1983; KesElman, 1975; 
Lane & Dunlap, 1978). 
Statisticians have preferred to think of "effect size" 
in terms of the noncentrality parameter. In fact, 
statisticians do not think of effect size in the same way 
as do behavioral researchers. Following the theoretical 
lead of Fisher and especially of Neyman and Pearson, 
mathematical statisticians have developed the concepts of 
central and noncentral distributions for test statistics. 
The central distribution is that taken by a test statistic 
under the null hypothesis. Its parameters are its degrees 
of freedom. When the alternative hypothesis is true the 
test statistic follows a noncentral distribution. The 
parameters of a noncentral distribution are its degrees 
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of freedom and its degree of "noncentrality," which 
characterizes the extent of the departure of a noncentral 
distribution from the central distribution. Thus, when a 
noncentrality parameter is egual to zero, equations for a 
noncentral distribution reduce to those for the corresponding 
central distribution. 
The use of noncentrality parameters in statistical power 
analys i s seems to be a barrier for many behavioral 
researchers. For example, tables and charts for the 
estimation of power for analysis of variance I tests are 
readily available in journal articles and general 
statistics texts (Dixon & Massey, 1983: Keppel, 1982: Kirk, 
1982; Morrison, 1983; Overall & Dalal, 1965; Pearson & 
Hartley, 1951; Botton & Schonemann, 1978; Tang, 1938; Tiku, 
1967; Winer, 1971). Yet these are rarely used by 
behavioral researchers. The chief difficulty is the 
requirement that the researcher be able to compute a 
noncentrality parameter so that power may be determined. 
Unfortunately, there are several problems associated with 
the use of noncentrality parameters from the point of 
view of behavioral researchers. 
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one is that the value of the noncentrality parameter in 
the analysis of variance (for example) is determined by 
several factors, including the magnitude of the treatment 
effect, the number of groups, sample size, and the population 
error variance. As a result, the noncentrality parameter 
does not have a clear and unambiguous operational 
interpretation, at least none beyond a rather general 
characterization as the departure from the null hypothesis. 
Lack of a clear conceptual definition for noncentrality 
parameters presents a problem for behavioral researchers who, 
if they are likely to think of effect size at all, are apt to 
think in terms of proportion of variance accounted for. 
Another problem is that the calculation of noncentrality 
parameters requires the researcher to specify actual values 
for the population error variance and for the group means (or 
for the deviations of the group means from the population 
grand mean). A noncentrality parameter may, of course, be 
expressed as a function of a proportion of variance 
statistic, a measure with which behavioral researchers 
are more comfortable and familiar. Unfortunately, though 
such relationships are not particularly complicated, they 
are rarely given explicitly either in texts or journal 
articles. Thus, the motivated researcher would 
have to dErive the relationship through algebraic 
manipulation. 
Yet another problem is that there are two different 
versions of the noncentrality parameter for the analysis of 
variance. These are lambda and phi. The two are very 
simply related. Yet it is annoying and probably not a 
little discouraging for behavioral researchers attempting 
to determine statistical power for the first time. The 
noncentral chi 2 distribution (upon whic h the noncentral 1 
distribution is based) was first derived by Fisher (1928), 
who gave beta 2 as the noncentrality parameter. Others 
changed the notation to the now familiar lambda (e.g., 
Neyman, 1937). Tang (1938), however, changed the 
operationalization of the noncentrality parameter to 
simplify the presentation of tabled power values for the 
analysis of variance. Tang (1938) called his noncentrality 
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parameter phi. 
Both lambda and phi are freguently encountered in 
current treatments of the power of analysis of variance 1 
tests. Most presentations of tables and charts of power 
use Tang's phi (e.g., Dixon & Massey, 1983; Keppel, 1982; 
Kirk, 1982; Lehmer, 1944; Morrison, 1983; Odeh & Fox, 1975; 
Pearson & Hartley, 1951; Rotton & Schonemann, 1978; Tiku, 
1967), although some use lambda (e.g., Overall & Dalal, 
1965). Technical expositions of the power of tne analysis 
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of variance usually refer to lambda as the noncentrality 
parameter (e.g., Koele, 1982; Laubscher, 1960; Mead, 
Bancroft, & Han, 1975; Norton, 1983; Patnaik, 1949; Severo & 
Zelen, 1960), although some use phi (e.g., Levine & Dunlap, 
1982; Nicewander & Price, 1983; Subkoviak & Levin, 1977; 
Tiku, 1966). Charts for sample size selection (curves of 
constant power) use neither lambda nor phi, but use instead a 
modified phi called phi' (Feldt & Mahmoud, 1958; Lindman, 
1974; Winer, 1971)! 
Notational differences among authors is a commonplace 
in statistical work and presents little difficulty for the 
expert, but can be an obstacle for those new to the area. 
Moreover, it is important to remember that the differences 
between lambda and phi (and phi') are not simply 
notational. The beginner may not even be able to overcome 
these difficulties by consulting the most popular 
graduate-level texts. Kirk (198~) and Keppel (1982) 
discuss only phi. Lambda is used by Hays (1981), but is 
referred to as delta2! Winer (1971) makes reference to all 
three versions of the noncentraiity parameter. Ironically, 
one of the earliest discussions of statistical power 
employed eta2 as the index of departure from the null 
hypothesis (Neyman & Pearson, 1931). 
Cohen's e ffect size indices. In his attempts to bring 
statistical p ower analysis to the behavioral sciences, 
Cohen (1962, 1965, 1969, 1977) has probably done more than 
any other wr i ter to popularize the use of effect size 
statistics. Cohen recognized that the lack of a 
conceptua l ly simple index of effect size was a major 
barrier to the use of statistical power by behavioral 
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researchers. Cohen's (1969, 1977) power handbook has had 
its greatest impact through his introduction of simple 
indices of effect size for several statistical techniques 
and for his operational definitions of small, medium, and 
large effects. 
Most influential has been Cohen's d, introduced as an 
index of effect size for the! test. ~ is simply the 
standardized difference between group means. It bears a 
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simple relationship both to delta, the noncentrality 
parameter of the power function of the 1 test (Hays, 1981; 
Laubscher, 1960; Winer, 1971), and to eta 2• Despite the 
similarity, Cohen's g has become more popular than either 
delta or eta2, no doubt largely due to its simple 
interpretation as the difference between group means 
expressed in standard deviation units. Cohen's~ is thus 
very similar to the familiar~ score (and for that matter, 
to! itself), both in form and interpretation. 
Cohen's effect size index for the analysis of variance 
is f, a generalized version of d. Cohen's i is the 
standard deviation of the~ standardized population means. 
As with d, i is closely related to the noncentrality 
parameter (both lambda and phi) and to eta 2 • (In fact, i 
is equal to phi'.) However, since the interpretation o~ i 
is vith respect to more than two group means, proportion of 
variance statistics will probably continue to provide the 
clearest assessment of effect size foe the analysis of 
variance. 
Cohen rejected the noncentrality parameter as an index 
of effect magnitude opting instead for simple indices with 
clear operational interpretations. There is a price to be 
paid for simplicity, however, and that is generality. 
Since many of the statistical techniques covered in Cohen's 
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handbook arise from the general linear model, treatment of 
statistical power could be handled compactly if approached 
in terms of the parameters of the noncentral distribution, 
that is, d~grees · of freedom and noncentrality parameter. 
An example of this approach is the monograph by Odeh and 
Fox (1975), which contains about 50 pages of text and about 
100 pages of nomographs. 
Cohen, on the other hand, elected to tailor his 
treatment of statistical power to fit the statistical test 
under consideration. In some cases this meant introducing 
a new index of effect size (e.g., g for student's i test), 
and in others using an already familiar measure (e.g.,~ 
for the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient). 
In every case, however, the result was the decomposition of 
the noncentrality parameter into its component parts: 
sample size and an effect size index appropriate for the 
statistical test. (An exception was Cohen's (1977; Cohen & 
Cohen, 1983) treatment of multiple regression, which was 
more conveniently presented in terms of the noncentrality 
parameter lambda.) Thus, Cohen required a separate chapter 
to "explain" the details of statistical power analysis for 
each statistical test covered. Furthermore, each chapter 
required its own tables of power and sample size, presented 
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in terms of the effect size index appropriate for that 
statistical test. Thus, conciseness had to be sacrificed: 
there are over 60 pages of tables for the analysis of 
variance alone. (By comparison, there are only 3 pages of 
tables for multiple regression, which retained the use of 
the noncentrality parameter.) There are 12 pages of power 
tables for the 1 test, even . though these give exactly the 
same results as for the analysis of variance tables with 
one numerator degree of freedom. The separate tables for 
the 1 test are necessary because the effect size index for 
the 1 test differs from that used for the analysis of 
variance (although the relationship is simply 1 = g / 2). 
The advantage of Cohen's approach is that his power 
tables are especially easy to use. Entry to most tables 
requires no more than a specification of sample size, 
effect size, and alpha level. What is demanded of Cohen's 
readers is that they become comfortable thinking in terms 
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of his effect size indices. For those already accustomed to 
thinking in terms of proportion of variance statistics, 
conversion formulas and tables are provided. 
Although Cohen's effect size indices may be artificial 
from a mathematical standpoint, they have been used with 
increasing frequency in recent treatments of power in the 
behavioral sciences (e.g., Barcikowski, 1973, 1981; Feldt, 
1973; Hornick & overall, 1980; Howell, 1982; Lipsey, 1983; 
Minium & Clarke, 1982; Welkowitz, Even, & Cohen, 1982). 
Furthermore, while no distributional work has yet been 
conducted on Cohen's f, research on the saapling 
distribution of Cohen's g has begun (Hedges, 1981, 1982, 
1983; Kraemer, 1983; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1982a). 
It must be admitted, however, that this work has not 
been motivated by considerations of statistical power 
analysis, but rather by the role of effect size indices in 
meta-analysis, a recently developed set of techniques for 
integrating the results of a series of independent 
experiments (Glass, 1976a; Glass, McGaw, & Smith, 1981; 
Hunter, Schmidt, & Jackson, 1982; Rosenthal, 1978; see also 
Chapter 4). Integration is usually with respect to both 
significance level and effect size. While significance 
levels are usually reported in the articles being reviewed, 
effect sizes usually are not. Therefore, the reviewer 
wishing to conduct meta-analysis must compute the effect 
size for each study using information readily available in 
the research report. Cohen's g has thus become the 
preferred index of effect size for meta-analysis due to the 
availability of means and standard deviations in most 
research reports. 
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Although meta-analysis has been criticized by many 
writers, it has certainly increased among behavioral 
researchers an interest in and an awareness of effect size. 
Unfortunately, there is yet little evidence that an 
increased interest in and awareness of statistical power 
has also taken place. Any recent issue of the Social 
Science Citation Inde~ will confirm that Cohen's (1969, 
1977) texts are frequently cited. Ironically, most of 
these citations are from meta-analyses concerned with 
Cohen's effect size measures. Only a few sources are 
concerned with statistical ·power analysis. 
Cohen's Definitions of Effect Magnitude 
---------------------------------------
Nearly as influential as his introduction of simple 
measures of effect size were Cohen's (1969, 1977) 
definitions of small, medium, and large effect sizes. The 
.OS level has long been accepted as the standard for 
statistical significance in behavioral research (Cowles & 
Davis, 1982b). One reason behavioral researchers may be 
reluctant to use effect size statistics is the lack of a 
standard similar to that used for statistical significance 
to gauge the magnitude of effect size. 
Since effect size is almost never reported in published 
research Cohen was unable to construct operational 
definitions of small, medium and large effect size on an 
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empirical basis. Thus, any such definitions would 
necessarily be arbitrary and probably unacceptable to many 
researchers. Nevertheless, Cohen felt the establishment of 
some standards would serve as an inducement for researchers 
to determine the statistical power of their research. That 
is, since information on effect size is generally not 
available in the literature, and since power cannot be 
determined without a specification of effect size, Cohen 
reasoned that even arbitrary guidelines would be better 
than none. 
Since the index of effect size was different for each 
statistical test, the operational definitions of small, 
medium, and large effect size necessarily differed for each 
statistical test. The problem this situation creates is 
that of consistency of definition of effect magnitude 
across the different types of statistical tests, as we 
shall soon see. Note, however, that such definitions are 
not even possible using the noncentrality parameter as the 
index of effect size, since the value of the noncentrality 
parameter depends on sample size. In this sense, the 
noncentrality parameter is no better an index of the 
magnitude of a treatment effect than is significance level, 
since both depend on sample size! 
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Cohen (1969, 1977) gave operational definitions of 
small, medium, and large effects for each of the 
statistical tests described in his power handbook:! test, 
Pearson r, difference between two r•s, sign test, 
difference between two proportions, chi-square test, 
analysis of variance and covariance, and in Cohen (1977) 
only, l test in multiple regression/correlation analysis. 
A complete specification of these definitions will be given 
in a subsequent chapter. For now, two examples may be 
considered representative (Cohen, 1962). 
1. For a 1 test of the hypothesis that the means of two 
independently drawn samples are equal, small, medium, and 
large effects were defined as mean group differences of 
0.25, 0.50, and 1.00 standard deviation, respectively. 
2. For the hypothesis that a correlation coefficient is 
zero, small, medium, and large effects were defined as 
correlations of .20, .40, and .60, respectively. 
Although some have criticized the specific magnitudes 
chosen to characterize small, medium and large effects 
(e.g., Howell, 1982), placing effect size on a continuum 
does have advantages. Perhaps the most important is that 
it emphasizes that there is no single alternative to the 
null hypothesis. Rather, one may think of a series of 
alternative hypotheses, which differ in their degree of 
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departure from the null. Thus, it is an oversimplification 
to discuss the power of a statistical test as a singular 
attribute of the test. Instead, one may characterize the 
power of a statistical test as having a range of values 
against a series of alternative hypotheses. Jt may be 
especially profitable for behavioral researchers to think 
in these terms, since there is often little justification 
for selecting only a single effect size against which to 
compute power. Determining power for a range of possible 
alternatives, even if these are not necessarily those 
advocated by Cohen, wi11 give the researcher a much better 
idea of the likelihood of obtaining significant results. 
This discussion suggests a modification to the familiar 
decision matrix shown in Table 1, so that the state of the 
population effect is characterized by a range of values 
rather than as simply present or absent. Table 2 presents 
the modified version of Table 1. 
Estimating power for a range of effect sizes will also 
greatly facilitate the interpretation of null results. For 
example, suppose that a researcher has obtained a 
nonsignificant test result and wishes to conclude that 




































































































































































































speaking, it is not possible to "accept" the null 
hypothesis: all that the researcher can conclude in this 
situation is that there is insufficient evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis. However, if a power analysis is 
conducted, a stronger conclusion may be possible. Table 3 
shows a paver analysis for a sample size of 30 and for a 
two-tailed test (alpha= .05) of t~e hypothesis that a 
population correlation is zero. The table reveals that our 
hypothetical researcher may feel reasonably sure that the 
population correlation is not as great as .SO. If the 
researcher desires a confi~ence level of 95% (i.e., one 
equivalent to that typically used for the rejection of the 
null hypothesis), then only population correlations greater 
than .60 may be ruled out. 
Table 3 also reveals that there is a substantial 
probability that a population correlation as great as .40 
may have escaped detection. If our researcher has good 
reason to believe that the population correlation should 
have been greater than .SO, or that a population 
correlation less than .40 would be meaningless, then the 
null results of the significance test are no less 
informative than if statistically significant results had 






















If, as is more likely to be true, our hypothetical 
researcher cannot assume a substantial population 
correlation, then the usual interpretation of null results 
must be invoked. In this situation the researcher may 
decide to (a) increase sample size, (b) increase alpha, (c) 
refine measurement techniques so as to reduce error and 
thereby increase the effective magnitude of the population 
correlation, or (d) abandon the research effort altogether. 
In any event, the results of this particular power analysis 
should impress upon the researcher the substantial sampling 
error of the correlation coefficient when sam~le sizes are 
small. 
1962 vs 1977 definitions. The definitions for small, 
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medium, and large effect size described previously were 
given by Cohen (1962). With the publication of his power 
handbooks, Cohen (1969, 1977) revised his definitions of 
effect size for each statistical test. All revisions 
resulted in somewhat smaller definitions of effect size 
than originally established. 
The changes in definition seem to have been made so 
that the magnitude of the effect implied by the various 
definitions would be more nearly eguivalent across 
statistical tests (Cohen, 1969, 1970). These changes will 
be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent chapter. 
For now two examples will be given. 
1. For the! test the definitions were changed from 
0.25, 0.50, and 1.00 standard deviation to 0.20, 0.50, and 
0.80 standard deviation for .small, medium, and large effect 
sizes, respectively. 
2. For Pearson's~ the definions were changed from .20, 
.40, and .60 to .10, .30, and .50 for small, medium, and 
large effect sizes, respectively. 
For ease of comparison, several of Cohen's "1962" and 
11 1977" effect size definitions have been converted to their 
equivalent proportion of variance statistics and displayed 
in Table 4. The proportion of variance statistic for the 1 
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test is t.he point-biserial r 2 , for the analysis of variance 
is eta 2 , and for Pearson's£ is r 2 • Since the 1 test and 
the analysis of variance (necessarily) give the same 
results, they are listed together in Table 4. 
Table 4 
E£fect Size Definitions in Terms of Proportion of 
Accounted for Variance 





















Note. Effect size definitions for 1962 and 1977 are 
from Cohen (1962) and (1977), respectively. The 
proportion of variance statistic for the! test is 
point-biserial r 2 , for ANOVA is eta 2 , and for 
Pearson~ is r2. 
Two points may be noted. First, the definitions for! 
tests and Pearson r•s are still not the same, though they 
are more nearly equal than in 1962. Cohen (1977) notes, 
however, that strict comparability is problematical, and 
probably not even desirable. For the 1 test the proportion 
of variance accounted for is based on the assumption that 
the groups belong to separate and distinct populations, and 
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is therefore equivalent to the point-biserial r 2 • The 
point-biserial£ is always less than the Pearson r, which 
assumes a continuous distribution for both variables. 
Applying a standard correction (e.g., Lindeman, Merenda, & 
Gold, 1980; KcMemar, 1962) to the 1977 point-biserial r 2 's 
(and assuming equal sample sizes) yields values quite close 
to the 1977 Pearson r 2 •s: .015, .092, and .216 for small, 
medium, and large effects, respectively. 
The second point to be noted about Table 4 is the small 
size of all the definitions, even those called "large.•• 
Certainly, the proportion of variance not accounted for 
even by a large effect is substantial. Nevertheless, the 
values reported in Table 4 may well be representative of 
the range of effect sizes characteristc of behavioral 
research. As noted earlier, Haase, Waechter, and Soloman 
(1982) found a median eta2 of .083 for counseling 
psychology research, and Brown (1975) reported a median r2 
of .051 for educational research. Both figures agree well 
with · Cohen's definition for a medium-sized effect. 
Criticisms of Effect Size Keasures 
Psychologists have probably become accustomed to being 
admonished for their failure to use measures of effect size 
more frequently than they do. What may then come as a 
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surprise to many is that there exists a sizeable body of 
critical commentary on the use of such measures. Some 
comments have simply advised researchers of the limitations 
of effect size indicators and urged appropriately cautious 
interpretation (e.g., Maxwell et al., 1981; Mitchell & 
Hartmann, 1981; o•Grady, 1982). Other writers have 
maintained that effect size statistics should never be used 
(e.g., Dooling & Danks, 1975; Sechrest & Yeaton, 1982), 
while still others would permit their use only in very 
narrowly defined circumstances (Glass & Hakstian, 1969). 
Several of the most important limitations of effect 
size statistics will be discussed in the following 
sections. Although these issues will be discussed as if 
they were separate problems, it should be clear that many 
are related. Discussion will be in the context of 
proportion of variance measures, since these are the most 
popular, have been used for the longest period of time, and 
have drawn the most critical commentary. 
Technical problems. Both epsilon 2 and omega 2 were 
developed to correct estimation bias in eta 2 and it has 
been pointed out that neither succeed in this effort (Glass 
& Hakstian, 1969). However, recent studies have indicated 
that the bias is small (Carroll & Nordholm, 1975; Demorest, 
1983; Keselman, 1975) • Moreover, one might simply "adopt 
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the •iew that even a biased estimator is better than none" 
(Vaughan & Corballis, 1969, p. 205). 
Another technical issue, one debated primarily among 
proponents of proportion of variance statistics, concerns 
the computational formulas for these statistics. One 
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aspect of this issue is how best to estimate variance 
components in mixed analysis of variance designs (Dodd & 
Schultz, 1973; Dwyer, 1974; Endler, 1966; Pleiss, 1969; 
Gaebelein et al., 1976; Vaughan & Corballis, 1969; Whimbey, 
Vaughan, & Tatsuoka, 1967), and in nonorthogonal designs 
(Bassler & Wolf, 1981; Keren & Lewis, 1976; LaTour, 1981a, 
1981b; Wolf & Bassler, 1980). Another aspect of this problem 
is how to represent the total variance (Cohen, 1973a; Haase, 
1983; Kennedy, 1970; Keren & Lewis, 1979). This problem will 
be discussed in the context of a specific issue (the "Number 
of Factors" problem) in a sutsequent section. Critics have 
largely ignored these technical problems, though some have 
complained about the resulting variety of effect size 
measures (Maxwell et al., 1981; Mitchell & Hartmann, 1981; 
Sechrest 6 Yeaton, 1982). 
Lack of work on the sampling distributions of epsilon 2 
and omega2 is another problem (ftaxwell et al., 1981; 
Mitchell & Hartmann, 1981). What little work has been 
conducted indicates that the sampling error for proportion 
of variance statistics may be substantial even for 
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relatively large sample sizes (Carroll & Faden, 1978; Carroll 
& Nordholm, 1975; Demorest, 1983; Keselman, 1975; Lane & 
Dunlap, 1978). For example, when the proportion of 
variance accounted for in the population is .15, the 
standard error of omegaz is .07 for the case of~= 30 for 
each of t..hree groups (Carroll & Nordholm, 1975). Thus, 
even with a total sample size of 90, the 95% confidence 
interval for omega2 in this case is .01 to .29! 
More work on the sampling distributions of proportion 
of variance statistics needs to be done, especially for 
cases where the assumptions of the analysis of variance 
have not been met. Although the analysis of variance may 
be robust in many circumstances, proportion of variance 
statistics may not be. Unfortunately, the current 
popularity of Cohen's~ for meta-analysis, and the 
distribution work this interest has engendered (Hedges, 
1981, 1982, 1983; Kraemer, 1983; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1982a), 
may retard theoretical investigations of other effect size 
measures. 
Publication bias. Even a casual perusal of the journal 
l iterature reveals that only a very small proportion of 
p ublished studies fails to obtain statistically significant 
results. Critics of significance tests have concluded that 
the paucity of nonsignificant results is not a reflection 
of the wonderful achievements of behavioral research, but 
rather is an indication of the editorial bias against the 
publication of null results (Bakan, 1966; McNemar, 1960; 
smart, 1964; Sterling, 1959). Thus, studies reporting 
significant results are more likely to be published than 
studies not reporting such results. 
One result of a publication bias against negative 
findings is that there may be more type I errors in the 
published literature than indicated by conventional alpha 
levels. Lane and Dunlap (1978) point out, however, that 
publication bias may affect estimates of effect size, as 
well, since larger effect sizes are more likely to be 
associated with significant results than are smaller effect 
sizes. Their simulation study revealed a substantial 
overestimation of effect size for a wide range of alpha 
levels (.001 to .20), population effect sizes (.01 to .20), 
and sample sizes (5 to 20 per group). As an example, 
suppose that the population effect size is equal to Cohen's 
definition for a medium-sized effect (proportion of 
variance accounted for is .06). Lane and Dunlap found 
that, when alpha was set at .OS, the average proportion of 
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variance accounted for obtained in 5000 simulated! tests 
with 10 subjects per group vas .26! For 20 subjects per 
group the overestimation was less but still substantial, 
with an average proportion of variance accounted for of 
approximately .15. 
While these results are disturbing, in practice it is 
likely that the extent of the overestimation is less than 
that indicated by Lane and Dunlap (1978). Their results 
assume that publication decisions are based only on the 
obtained significance level. It is doubtful that anyone 
really believes that this is the case. Furthermore, their 
results shoved a strong tendency to converge on the 
population effect size with increasing sample size. 
Unfortunately, sample sizes larger than 20 per group were 
not examined. Finally, since the obtained effect sizes in 
behavioral research are usually quite small, the extent of 
overestimation can not be very great. 
Desiqn_!_y~ Many critics have pointed out that 
proportion of variance statistics may produce misleading 
results because of their dependence on various design 
characteristics of a study. For example, whether a study 
is run with a between-groups or with a repeated measures 
design vill greatly influence the proportion of variance 
accounted for (O'Grady, 1982). Repeated measures factors 
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alaost always produce larger effects through the reduction 
of error variance. In addition, when both repeated 
measures and between-groups factors are included in the 
design, it is common for a significant repeated measures 
effect to account for less variance than is accounted for 
by a nonsignificant between-groups effect, again because of 
the smaller error term used foe testing repeated measures 
factors. 
Number of factors. The number of factors included in 
an investigation can also ~nfluence proportion of variance 
accounted for. Inclusion of a strong manipulation may 
prevent a second, but weaker, manipulation from accounting 
for as much variance as it would if the stronger factor 
were eliminated from the design. Interaction effects are 
frequently weak, since main effects will often "eat up" 
most of the reliable variance. Similarly, between-groups 
factors often account for a discouragingly small proportion 
of variance when repeated measures factors are also present 
in the design. 
Some have proposed modifying the computational formulas 
£or proportion 0£ variance measures to remove the influence 
of one factor from another. The result has been measures 
such as partial eta 2 {Cohen, 1973a; Haase, 1983; Kennedy, 
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1970), and partial omega 2 (Keren 6 Levis, 1979). The 
variance due to a factor is compared to error variance and 
not to total variance, the variance due to other factors 
having been removed from the equation. Unfortunately, it 
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is then possible for the sum of the proportions of variance 
accounted for by all effects to exceed unity as has been 
pointed out by several critics (Breen 6 Gaito, 1970; Sechrest 
6 Yeaton, 1982). 
Range of levels. The choice of specific levels for the 
independent variable may have a large impact on the 
resulting magnitude of the effect (Dooling & Danks, 1975; 
Fisher, 1946; Glass & Hakstian, 1969; LaTour, 1981a, 1981b; 
Levin, 1967; Lindquist, 1953; Maxwell et al., 1981; Mitchell 
& Hartmann, 1981; Norton 6 Lindquist, 1951; O'Grady, 1982; 
Sechrest & Yeaton, 1982). Widely spaced levels, often used 
in exploratory work, will produce a larger effect than more 
closely spaced levels (assuming a monotonic relationship 
between variables). As a restriction in range problem, only 
a small proportion of variance might be accounted for, 
although the relationship between the variables in the 
population might be substantial. 
Alternatively, some critics fear that researchers may 
attempt to inflate their treatment effects through the 
inclusion of a group already known (or presumed) to have a 
large impact. Inclusion of such a "good" group in the 
design guarantees that a larger proportion of variance will 
be accounted for, especially when treatment effects might 
otherwise be small. such a "trick" would be easily 
discovered though. Post hoc examination of follow-up 
tests, or simply of group means and standard deviations, 
should reveal that a single group accounted for most of the 
reliable variance. 
Fixed and random effects. The range of levels problem 
may also be thought of in terms of fixed and random 
effects. Several critics have argued that the fixed 
effects model is most freguently employed in behavioral 
research, but that only in the random effects case may the 
resea~cher freely generalize results to all levels of the 
independent variable (Dooling & Danks, 1975; Glass & 
Hakstian, 1969; Maxwell et al., 1981). These critics are 
concerned that researchers using fixed effects designs may 
generalize their obtained effect size beyond the specific 
levels of the independent variable. Of course, this 
problem applies to the analysis of variance f test as well, 
so that it is not clear why behavioral researchers should 
forge~ the distinction between fixed and random factors 
only when they begin reporting measures of effect size. 
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Certainly, as Halderson and Glasnapp (1972) point out, any 
researcher interested in using effect size statistics knows 
better than to make this mistake. 
Omega2 in particular was developed within the context 
of the fixed-effects analysis of variance model (Hays, 
1963). However, several writers have pointed out that it 
is meaningless to speak of the total variance in the 
dependent variable as a population estimate, since there is 
no population which corresponds to the specific levels of 
the treatment groups (Dooling & Danks, 1975; Glass & 
Hakstian, 1969; Maxwell et al., 1981). Hays (1963, 1973) 
has argued that such a population estimate can be defined 
by assuming that the relative sample sizes of the treatment 
groups are proportional to their representation in the 
population. This solution, however, underscores the 
problematical nature of the use of omega 2 in nonorthogonal 
designs. 
Subject characteristics. Several critics have pointed 
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out that whether subject groups are heterogeneous or 
homogeneous will affect the magnitude of the treatment 
effect (Glass & Hakstian, 1969; Golding, 1975; O'Grady, 1982; 
Porter, Schmidt, Floden, & Freeman, 1978; Sechrest & 
Yeaton, 1982). Subject heterogeneity between groups 
maximizes treatment variance and thus tends to increase 
effect size, while subject heterogeneity within groups 
increases error and so decreases . effect size. Similarly, 
subject homogeneity within groups tends to increase effect 
size, while homogeneity between groups decreases effect 
size. The problem is clearly related to the problems of 
range of levels and restriction in range. 
Carver (1975) has noted an interesting manifestation of 
this problem. He notes that items on achievement tests are 
selected to maximize individual differences, since items 
which are too easy or too difzicult are deleted during test 
construction. When such tests are used in between-groups 
designs, variance due to individual differences becomes 
part of the error variance, so that the experimental 
treatment or manipulation cannot account for very much of 
the total variance. 
Measurement error. Perhaps the most important factor 
to be considered in the interpretation of proportion of 
variance statistics is reliability. All researchers must 
confront the problem of measurement error in the response 
variable, but what many researchers may not realize is that 
measurement error applies to the independent variable as 
well. Precision in the operationalization of the treatment 
decreases error variance and so permits a greater 
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p r oportion of variance to be accounted for (Dooling & 
Danks, 1975; Glass & Hakstian, 1969; Mitchell & Hartmann, 
1981; O'Grady, 1982; Porter et al., 1978; Sechrest & 
Yea ton, 1982). Measurement error is small when the 
in J ependent variable can be defined in simple, quantitative 
te r ms. A classic example of a simple, quantitative 
var i able may be found in "mental rotation" studies, where 
t h e i ndependent variable is the angle of orientation 
(mea s ured in degrees) of a stimulus figure (Shepard & 
Metz l e r, 1971). Of course, in most areas of behavioral 
resea r c h such simplicity i~ exceptional. O'Grady (1982) 
notes, f or example, that there are at least eight different 
ways to define as sim~le a variable as subject sex! 
Compl ex treatment variables are more typical of 
behavior a l research. In general, when a larger number of 
characteristics are needed to define or operationalize a 
treatment there will be more potential sources of 
measurement error, which will decrease the reliability of 
the treatment and limit the proportion of variance that may 
be accounted for. 
In many cases different researchers will operationalize 
what is ostensibly the same construct in different ways. 
For example, in how many different ways have researchers 
characterized high vs low "anxiety"? Under such 
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circumstances it may be meaningless to compare the effect 
sizes obtained by different researchers. In fact, it may 
be difficult or impossible to meaningfully C?mpare effect 
sizes for different treatments even within the same study, 
since the treatments may, and usually will differ in degree 
of precision (Dooling & Danks, 1975). The root of the 
problem is that behavioral researchers usually lack an 
independent means of assessing the effectiveness of their 
manipulations (Sechrest & Yeaton, 1981, 1982). 
The issue of reliability is more familiar to behavioral 
researchers in the context of the response or dependent 
variable. With respect to effect size, the problem is 
essentially the same as for the independent variable: 
measurement error limits the proportion of variance that 
may be accounted for (LaTour, 1981a, 1981b; Mitchell & 
Hartmann, 1981; O'Grady, 1982; Porter et al., 1978; Sechrest 
& Yeaton, 1982). 
The extent of the effect of measurement error on effect 
size is easily specified if the reliabilities of the 
variables are known. Simply, the proportion of variance 
shared by two variables cannot exceed the product of their 
reliabilities (Ghiselli, Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981). Thus, 
it is not surprising that validity coefficients are seldom 
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much greater than .SO and are more often closer to .30. 
Furthermore, failure to obtain a treatment effect produces 
an ambiguous situation, notwithstanding considerations of 
statistical power: Is there no effect because there is no 
relationship between the variables, or because the 
reliability of one or both of the variables is low? 
Behavioral researchers often conclude that there is no 
relationship without sufficient consideration of 
reliability. 
Effect Siz e as an Index of Practical Significance 
Many propone n ts of the use of effect size statistics 
have characterized these measures as indices of practical 
significance. Since statistical significance is simply a 
function of sample size, the use of measures of practical 
significance is often seen as a safeguard against the 
acceptance of trivial differences between groups as 
"significant" or important. Th us, results that are 
"highly" significant (e.g., p < .0001) may be considered 
unimportant if the obtained effect size is small. Large 
effect sizes are, of course, to be interpreted as 
important. Some reseachers have gone so far as to 
recommend that effect size statistics be interpreted 
regardless of the results of the significance test (e.g., 
Carver, 1978) • 
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Unfortunately, as was pointed out in the previous 
section, effect size statistics have limitations, just as 
significance tests do, and these limitations decrease the 
extent to which measures of effect size may be useful as 
indicators of the importance of a treatment effect 
(Golding, 1975; LaTour, 1981a, 1981b; O'Grady, 1982). 
Too great an emphasis on the proportion of variance 
accounted for by an effect may well undervalue its actual 
contribution, especially if one is inclined to note the 
proportion of variance not accounted for! Yet it is 
incorrect to suppose that 100% of the variance could be 
accounted for unless measurement error could be eliminated. 
In practice, unreliability will severely constrain the 
proportion of variance that can be accounted for, 
especially when the constructs being studied are assessed 
by single, rather than by aggregated measures. 
Instead of considering the variance in an experiment as 
divided into two parts--variance accounted for and variance 
not accounted for--Sechrest and Yeaton {1982) suggest that 
total variance be conceptualized as divided into three 
parts: (a) reliable variance which can be accounted for by 
treatment effects; (b) reliable variance which cannot be 
accounted for by treatment effects, hut which might be 
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attributable to variables not included in the design of the 
study; and (c) error variance, which is due to measurement 
error and thus unreliable by definition. Measures of 
effect size give an estimate of variance (a), and are 
contrasted with the sum of variances (b) and {c). Sechrest 
and Yeaton (1982) suggest, however, that variance (a) be 
compared only to variance (b), since the sum of variances 
(a) and (b) represent the total amount of variance in the 
system that can be accounted for. Their suggestion 
underscores the fact that a small effect size may be more 
an indication of measurement error than a lack of a 
relationship between variables. Unfortunately, there is 
generally no way to separate variance (b) from variance 
(C) • 
O'Grady (1982) has also emphasized that effect size may 
not always be a good indication of importance. A large 
effect size may be trivial if the problem addressed by the 
research is itself inconsequential, or if it is simply a 
demonstration of an obvious relationship. Judgment of the 
importance of an effect also depends on the type of 
research being conducted. If the goal of the research is 
prediction, t hen a large effect size is required. However, 
if the goal of the research is exploratory, then even a 
small effect size may help researchers understand the 
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relationships of the variables involved, and help guide the 
design of future experiments. 
Specific examples of effects of small, medium, and 
large magnitude, according to Cohen's (1977) definitions 
(see Table 4), may be helpful in keeping the proportion of 
variance issue in perspective. Cohen (1977) has given the 
following examples: 
1. Small Effects: the difference in mean IQ between 
twins and nontvins: the difference in mean height between 
15 and 16 year old girls; 
2. Medium Effects: the difference in mean IQ between 
professionals and managers: the difference in mean height 
between 14 and 18 year old girls; 
3 . Large Effects: the difference in mean IQ between 
holders of the Ph.D. degree and college freshmen; the 
difference in mean height between 13 and 18 year old girls. 
Whether or not one is willing to accept these 
definitions is a matter of personal preference, and 
probably depends at least to some extent on one•s area of 
specialization. Cohen's reasoning vas simply that a 
medium-sized effect should be "large enough to be visible 
to the naked eye. That is, in the course of normal 
experience, one would become aware of an average difference 
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in IQ between ••• members of professional and managerial 
occupational group" (Cohen, 1977, p. 26). Large effects 
would seem to be "grossly perceptible" while small effects 
would not usually be discernable without statistical aid. 
One particularly dramatic transformation of proportion 
of variance statistics is the "binomial effect size 
display" (BESD) recently proposed by Rosenthal and Rubin 
(1979, 1982b, 1982c; Rosenthal, 1982, 1983; Huberty & 
Holmes, 1983, independently came to similar conclusions; 
for a comment on and extension of the BESD see Preece, 
1983). These writers note that a treatment which improves 
success rate from 35% to 65% accounts for only 9% of the 
variance; an improvement from 25% to 75% accounts for just 
25% of the variance! (This work seems to have made guite an 
impression on applied researchers, but it is new only in 
the context of the point-biserial r. Similar work for the 
continuous case has been around for a long time: Curtis & 
Alf, 1968; Levy, 1967; Symonds, 1930; Tilton, 1937). 
These illustrations suggest that the fact that an 
effect accounts for only a small proportion of total 
variance does not necessarily mean that it is a trivial 
effect. The importance of an effect cannot be judged by a 
proportion of variance statistic in isolation any more than 
by the sole consideration of a significance test result. 
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The role of the effect in theory, the nature of the 
investigation (e.g., exploratory vs. confirmatory) and its 
consequences, the reliability of the measures involved, as 
well as many other factors, must all be considered before 
the magnitude of an effect can be evaluated. 
One final example, taken from an entirely different 
research domain, should provide a powerful illustration of 
the occasional importance of small effects. The point in 
its orbit at which the planet Mercury is closet to the Sun 
advances by 40 arc seconds per century (about .0001 degree 
per year) more than can be accounted for by orbital 
perturbations due to the other planets. Before its 
solution, many theories were suggested to explain the 
anomaly, but one especially captures the magnitude of this 
phenomenon: a modest change _in the inverse-square law of 
gravitation so that the distance dependence relation 
bec ·omes r-2.0000001s74 instead of r-2 can account for the 
discrepancy (Roseveare, 1982) ! Of course, the ability of 
Einstein's general theory of relativity to account for the 
anomalistic advance of Mercury's perihelion is considered 
one of the greatest accomplishments of modern science. 
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summary 
To esti~ate the statistical power of a proposed study 
the researcher must be able to anticipate the magnitude of 
the treatment effect. In principle, this is not difficult 
to do. In practice, there are several reasons why 
researchers do not estimate effect size, and as a 
consequence remain unaware of the statistical power of 
their research. The emphasis on significance testing 
procedures in most graduate and undergraduate textbooks 
seems to have created among behavioral researchers the 
impression that significance level may he used as an 
indicator of the size and importance of a treatment effect. 
It is not uncommon, for instance, to see results reported 
as "highly significant" accompanied by a significance level 
of (for instance) £ < 10- 7 used to impress the reader with 
the importance of the findings. 
Another consequence of the significance testing routine 
is that measures of effect size have remained generally 
unknown to applied researchers despite the existence of a 
variety of such measures. Noncentrality parameters are 
preferred by mathematical statisticians since power 
functions are most conveniently expressed in such terms. 
Unfortunately, noncentrality parameters do not have clear 
operational interpretations, and although some 
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statisticians have argued for a greater use o f 
noncentrality pa rameters as effect size indices (Bargmann, 
1970; Venables, 1975), behavioral researchers have not been 
inclined to do so. 
Proportion of variance statistics have been the most 
popular measures of effect size among behavioral 
researchers. Several different versions exist and have 
been described in detail in the journal literature, 
although textbock coverage has been less extensive. Thus, 
proportion of variance statistics are still infrequently 
included in published research reports. 
Cohen (1977) has introduced new measures of effect size 
for several of the most common statistical techniques. 
Cohen sought to develop indices with very simple conceptual 
interpretations so as to reduce the complexity of 
statistical power analysis. Unfortunately, h is techniques 
have not yet come into wide usage except as indicators of 
effect size in meta-analyses. Determination of statistical 
power by applied researchers is even less common than the 
reporting of measures of effect size. 
Since behavioral researchers frequently do not know 
what effect size to expect in their research, Cohen (1977) 
suggested that power be computed for a range of effect 
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sizes. Cohen therefore introduced standardized definitions 
of small, medium, and large effect size . Although these 
definitions were determined rationally, surveys of effect 
sizes obtained in behavioral research have been consistent 
with Cohen's definitions. Unfortunately, very few such 
surveys have been conducted and more are necessary to 
obtain a reasonable assessment of the magnitude of effects 
characteristic of behavioral research. 
Some researchers have vigorously criticized measures of 
effect size, particularly proportion of variance 
statistics. Many of these ·criticisms are valid and suggest 
that effect size measures be interpreted cautiously. In 
particular, researchers should be careful in using effect 
size as an index of the importance of a treatment effect. 
The interfretive limitations on effect size statistics ~re 
not widely known among behavioral researchers. If, as 
expected, effect size statistics become more widely used in 
the next fev years, it will be important for methodologists 
to communicate more effectively with applie~ ·researchers so 





Power survey of current Psychological Research 
Cohen's Power Survey 
Given the widespread lack of interest in statistical 
power exhibited by behavioral scientists, it is natural to 
wonder what the effect of such disinterest might be on the 
power of behavioral research. Cohen (1962) was the first 
to conduct a systematic survey of the statistical power of 
any area of behavioral research, and his paper has been 
credited with introducing the concept of statistical power 
into the literature of the social sciences (Chase & Tucker, 
1976; but for an earlier account of power see Mosteller & 
Bush, 1954) • 
Cohen (1962) surveyed all of the articles published in 
the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology for the year 
1960 · (volume 61), a total of 78 papers. Eliminated from 
consideration were articles in which no statistical tests 
were conducted (e.g., case reports, factor-analytic 
studies, etc.), reducing the total to 70 papers. Also 
eliminated were statistical tests considered to be of a 
"peripheral" nature, that is, tests which did not address 
the major hypotheses under investigation. Peripheral tests 
typically included tests of significance for all of the 
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correlation coefficients in a factor analysis, tests of 
reliability coefficients, unhypothesized interactions in 
analysis of variance designs, and so on. This procedure 
reduced the total number of statistical tests for which 
power was estimated from 4829 to 2088. 
To determine power for each statistical test Cohen 
assumed nondirectional hypothesis testing at alpha= .OS, 
and recorded the sample size on which each test was based. 
The major difficulty for Cohen was the estimation of the 
effect size on which to base the power determinations. 
Because authors never reported the expected population 
effect size, Cohen el e cted to estimate the power of each 
statistical test for a range of effect sizes: small, 
medium, and large. The operational definitions of small, 
medium, and large effect sizes necessarily differed 
depending on the type of statistical test under 
consideration. Metric-free population parameters were 
defined for seven different statistical tests:! test, 
Pearson r, ~ test for the difference between two 
correlation coefficients, sign test,~ test for differences 
between two proport i ons, chi square test, and the r test in 
the analysis of variance and covariance. Two examples are 
described below. 
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1. For a! test of the hypothesis that the means of two 
independently drawn samples are equal, small, medium, and 
large effects were defined as mean group differences of 
0.25, 0.50, and 1.00 standard deviation, respectively. 
2. For the hypothesis that a correlation coefficient is 
zero, small, medium, and large effects were defined as 
correlations of .20, .40, and .60, respectively. 
Admittedly arbitrary, Cohen (1962) believed these 
definitions were nevertheless reasonable. 
Cohen's (1962) ~rocedure resulted in three power 
estimates for each statistical test, based on the 
assumption of a small, medium, or large sized effect. 
Power for each article was estimated by averaging across 
all of the major statistical tests reported in the art.ic.le. 
The power of abnormal-socia.l psychological research as a 
whole was then estimated by averaging across the results 
for each of tne 70 articles. The average power was .18 for 
small effects, .48 for medium effects, and .83 for large 
effects. (A separate power analysis conducted on the 
"peripheral" tests gave similar results.) These results 
demonstrated that, even for medium-sized effects, the 
probability that a false null hypothesis could .be rejected 
was less than one-half. 
Cohen (1962} had two recommendations on how to improve 
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matters. First was that increasing sample size would be 
the most effective means of increasing the power of 
abnormal-social psychological research. Manipulation of 
any of the other factors related to power would be less 
likely to be effective and more likely to be controversial 
(e.g., increasing alpha to .10). Cohen's second 
recommedation was that researchers routinely determine the 
power of their experimental designs before collecting their 
data. In the event that a priori estimates of effect size 
were unavailable, Cohen suggested that power be estimated 
for the range of effect sizes used in his paper. 
Results of Other Power surveys 
Since the report of Cohen's (1962) power survey, the 
concept of statistical power . has been gradually introduced 
in a variety of research areas. Issues relating to power 
have been discussed in the fields of special education 
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(Hopkins, 1973), behavioral genetics (Klein, 1974), 
psychopharmacology (Overall, Hollister, & Dalal, 1967), 
social work (Crane, 1976, 1977; Schuerman, 1977), consumer 
research (Sawyer, 1982), medical outcome research (Berk & 
Chalmers, 1981; Freiman, Chalmers, Smith, & Kuebler, 1978), 
endocrinology (Poland, Rubin, & Weichsel, 1980), epidemiology 
(Whaley, Quade, & Haley, 1980), even ge ography (Bones, 1972) ! 
Several other power surveys have also been conducted, 
encouraged by Cohen's (1969) subsequent publication of 
convenient power tables (see Table 5). These more recent 
surveys have covered research in a number of areas, 
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including educational research (Brewer, 1972; Erewer & Owen, 
1973; Daly & Hexamer, 1983; Pennick & Brewer, 1972; Woolley & 
Dawson, 1983), health research (Christensen & Christensen, 
1977; Jones & Brewer, 1972, speech research (Chase & Tucker, 
1975; Katzer & Sodt, 1973), research in counselor education 
(Haase, 1974), sociological research (Spreitzer & Chase, 
1974), research on speech disorders (Kroll & Chase, 1975), 
research on mass communication (Chase & Baran, 1976), applied 
psychological research (Chase & Chase, 1976), research in 
physical anthropolo gy (Chase, Chase, & Tucker, 1978), 
gerontological research (Levenson, 1980), and marketing . 
research (Sawyer & Ball, 1981). 
Al l of these surveys have closely followed the 
procedures set by Cohen (1962). All of the studies using 
statistics in one or more journals were surveyed for a 
period of time, usually one or two years. Power values for 
most surveys were averaged across studies, although averaging 
across statistical tests was used in a few ~urveys (Brewer, 
1972; Brewer & Owen, 1973; Jones & Brewer, 1972). For all 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There is one major difference in method between the 
power survey conducted by Cohen (1962) and those conducted 
by later investigators. This difference concerns the 
definitions of small, medium, and large effect sizes. 
Changes in these definitions were suggested by Cohen (1969, 
1970) himself so that the magnitude of the effect implied 
by the various definitions would be more nearly equivalent 
to each other. The difference between the "1962" and 
"1977" . definitions of effect size was discussed in detail 
in Chapter 2. Two examples are repeated here for 
convenience. For the 1 test the definitions were changed 
from 0.25, 0.50, and 1.00 standard deviation to 0.20, 0.50, 
and 0.80 standard deviation for small, medium, and large 
effect sizes, respectively. For the Pearson correlation 
coefficient the definitions were changed from .20, .40, and 
.60 to .10, .30, and .50 for small, medium, and large 
effect sizes, respectively. 
Since these changes resulted in somewhat smaller effect 
size definitions, a decrease in power might have been 
expected for subsequent power surveys. Instead, results 
were generally similar to those obtained by Cohen (1962). 
Table 6 shows the power estimates for all of the surveys 
and for the combined results. With few exceptions, most 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6 (Cont'd) 
Results of Power surveys of Behavioral Research 
-----------------------------------------------------------Notes: Definitions for small, medium and large effect sizes 
are ~ased on Cohen (1969) for all surveys except Cohen 
(1962). All power values are averaged across articles 
except for Brewer (1972), Jones and Brewer (1972), and 
Brewer and Owen (1973), which are averaged across tests. 
NR = not reported. 
1power estimates are based on grouped frequency data. 
2Results for the nine journals in this survey are not 
reported because of the small sample sizes on which each 
was based. 
3Results for the individual journals in this survey were 
not recorded in the published report. 
•Totals are given for articles and tests. Means are given 
·for power estimates, and are weighted by the number of 
articles. 
Sftedians are for listed table entries. 
----------------------------------------· ---------------
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given the diverse nature of the research fields covered. 
The average power estimates across the 20 power surveys is 
.23, .61, and .83 for small, medium, and large effects, 
respectively. These results are based on nearly 22000 
statistical tests published in 1100 journal articles. 
Another way of viewing these data is given in Table 7, 
which shows the percentage of studies with power less than 
.80 and .SO for small, medium, and large effects. These 
results demonstrate that, given a medium-sized effect, 66, 
of the studies surveyed failed to achieve power of .80, 
while 41j obtained a power value of less than .50. If one 
adopts Cohen's (1965, 1977) suggestion of .80 as the 
minimum desirable power value, then Table 6 shows that the 
power of the surveyed research is inadequate to detect all 
but large effects. Even so, as Table 7 indicates, nearly 
one-third of the surveyed studies failed to reach power of 
.80 even for large effects. 
Power survey of current Psychological Research 
----------------------------------------------
The inadequate level of statistical power indicated by 
the results of power surveys has created some concern among 
. 
methodologists about the health of psychological research 
(e.g., Bakan, 1966; Cohen, 1965; Greenwald, 1975; Smart, 
1964; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), especially with respect to 
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Table 7 (Cont'd) 
Percentage of studies with Power Less than .80 and .50 
NR = not reported. 
1 Figures are for percentages of statistical tests (not 
articles). 
2 Figures are for all journals combined. 
3 Means are weighted by the number of articles in each 
survey. 
•Medians are for listed table entries. 
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One surprising aspect of these surveys is that, since 
the publication of Cohen's survey, only one other power 
survey has been conducted on psychological research (see 
Table 5). Chase and Chase (1976) computed the average 
statistical power of studies published in the Journal of 
Applied Psychology. They found that, although power was 
very low for small effect sizes (.25), power for 
medium-sized effects was higher (.67) than that found 
either by Cohen (.48) or in other power surveys. Power to 
detect large effects was very good (.86). Furthermore, 
Chase and Chase (1976) did not base their power estimates 
on those used by Cohen (1962), but used instead the 
somewhat smaller "1977" definitions of effect size. 
The irony of these results is that the inadequate 
statistical power often attributed to psychological 
research is based primarily on power surveys of research in 
other fields and on Cohen's results, which were gathered 
over 20 years ago. The only recent survey of power in 
psychological research--that of Chase and Chase 
(1976)--presented a relatively less gloomy picture. On the 
other hand, applied psychological research may not be 
representative of research in other areas of psychology. 
In particular, the sample sizes characteristic of research 
reported in the Journal of .!12.12lieg Psychology are 
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substantially larger than the sample sizes of most 
psychological research. Mucbinsky (1979) reported average 
sample sizes in the Journal of Applied Psychol..Q.g,Y of 
approximately 350. Sample sizes for most other 
psychological journals are only about 50 or 60 (Holmes, 
1979; Holmes, Holmes, 6 Fanning, 1981). 
The primary purpose of Study I is to provide a more 
current assessment of the power of psychological research 
than is now available. Two journals were selected for the 
survey: the J982 volumes of the Journal 2! Personality and 
Social Psychology and of the Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology. These two journals are representative of a 
substantial portion of psychological research, and are 
guite selective, with rejection rates of 79% and 83%, 
respectively, for 1982 ("Summary Report," 1983). 
Furthermore, both are the direct 11descendents 11 of the 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, the journal 
examined by Cohen (1962). Thus, a second purpose of this 
study was to provide a direct comparison to Cohen's 
results, to discover what change has occurred over the past 
20 years in the power of abnormal and social psychological 
research. 
Any really meaningful increase in power vaiues is most 
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likely to occur at the medium effect size level. Cohen's 
power estimate of .48 for medium-sized effects was based on 
a larger definition of effect size than that used in 
subsequent surveys. Yet, as Table 6 shows, other surveys 
have reported higher power at this level of effect 
magnitude (averaging about .60). Thus, an increase in 
power here would not be suprising when Cohen's original 
effect size definitons are used to calculate power. 
However, it is probably optimistic to suppose that such an 
increase will be so great as to approach .80, a frequently 
cited criterion of adequate statistical power. 
Furthermore, it will be interesting to observe whether 
power for medium-sized effects increases at all when the 
more recent (and smaller) effect size definitions are used 
to calculate power. 
Power for large and small effects should be less 
affected either by time or by changes in effect size 
definitions. Power for large effect sizes is already 
reasonably high, a nd would require substantial increases in 
sample size to effect an increase in power. surveys of 
sample sizes used in psychological research have shown no 
such trends (Holmes, 1979; Holmes, Holmes, 6 Fanning, 1981). 
Power for small effect sizes is so low that only heroic 
increases in sample size could result in satisfactory power 
values. Even a large increase in power for small effects, 
while noteworthy academically, will still result in only 
humble odds for detecting such effects. For all practical 
purposes, the detection of small effects in psychological 
research will remain problematic for many years to come. 
Efforts at detecting such effects, if they are to be 
successful, may have to achieve greater statistical power 
by concentrating less on increasing sample size and by 
directing more resources towards increasing the magnitude 
of the effect, such as by employing more sensitive 
measurement models, and more effective experimental 
manipulations. 
Method 
Selection Procedures: Articles 
All of the articles published in the Journal of 
Personality and Social ~sycholQ.g;L~ 1982, volume 42, and the 
Journal of Abnormal PsychoJ&g_yL 1982, volume 91, were 
examined and articles not reporting any statistical tests 
were eliminated from the study. In addition, some articles 
were excluded because they contained only statistical 
methods for which power could not be determined. The 
selection procedures for statistical tests are described 
below. 
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Selection Procedures: statistical Tests 
---------------------------------------As in previous surveys, a distinction was made between 
1111ajor" and "peripheral" statistical tests. Major tests 
are those which bear directly on the research hypotheses of 
the study, while peripheral tests do not. Peripheral tests 
were not included in the survey. Peripheral tests included 
all of the correlation coefficients of a factor or 
principal component analysis, unhypothesized higher order 
interactions in the analysis of variance, manipulation 
checks, inter-rater reliability coefficients, reliabilities 
of psychometric tests (internal consistency, test-retest), 
post hoc analysis of variance procedures (simple effects, 
multiple comparisons), and tests of statistical 
assumptions. In general, all statistical tests reported 
within the Kethod section of an article were excluded as 
well. 
For "major" sta~istical tests, power determinations 
were limited to the those listed in Table 8. These tests 
were selected for several reasons. Perhaps most important, 
only these tests (except for multiple regression) were used 
in Cohen (1962). Cohen's choices were based on two 
factors: the frequency of a statistic's occurrence, and the 
availability of equations for power calculations for a 
statistic. Subsequent power surveys have also limited 
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consideration to just these statistical tests. Here, the 
primary limiting factor was that Cohen's (1969) power 
handbook contained tables only for these statistics, and it 
is clear that these surveys would never have been conducted 
had this source not been available. 
Table 8 
statistical Tests Included in the Power survey 
----------------------------------------------------
1. Student's~ test 
2. Pearson£ 
3. ~ test for differences between correlation 
coefficients 
4. test that a proportion is .50 (sign test) 
5. ~ test for differences between proportions 
6. chi-sguare test 
7. X tests on means in the analysis of variance and 
covariance 
8. X tests in multiple regression/correlation 
analysis 
---------------------------------------------------
As indicated in Table 8, multiple regression was 
included in this power survey, even though it was not 
included in Cohen's (1962) original survey. Multiple 
regression has also not been included in most previous 
power surveys, probably because Cohen's (1969) first power 
handbook did not include power tables for multiple 
regression. It should also be pointed out that in most 
textbook discussions of multiple regression the issue of 
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statistical power is treated in a most cursory fashion, if 
at all (e.g., Edwards, 1979; Freund & Minton, 1979; Gunst & 
Mason, 1980; Harris, 1975; Johnson & iichern, 1982; Lindeman 
et al., 1980; Lunneborg & Abbott, 1983; Marascuilo & Levin, 
1983; Pedhazur, 1982) ~ 
Cohen (1962) could ignore multiple regression because 
the technique was rarely used at the time (Edgington, 
1964). Later researchers should have realized that, since 
multiple regression and the analysis of variance are 
identical analytical system~ (Cohen, 1968; Cohen & Cohen, 
1983), tables for the latter could have been used to 
determine power for most analyses structured as multiple 
regressions. Furthermore, Cohen's (1977) revised power 
handbook does include tables for the power of 1 tests in 
multiple regression. Since the use of this technique is no 
longer rare (Moore, 1981), it was decided to include 
multiple regression in the present power survey. 
Primarily excluded from the survey are most 
nonparametric techniques (e.g., Mann-Whitney u, Wilcoxin, 
Kruskal-Wallis, rank order correlation tests, etc.), 
multivariate methods (e.g., discriminant analysis, 
canonical correlation, multivariate analysis of variance), 
and various other methods for which the concept of power is 
not relevant (e.g., factor analysis, principal component 
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analysis, cluster analysis, time-series analysis, 
multidimensional scaling, log-linear methods, causal 
modeling, etc.). 
surveys of the use of statistics in psychological 
research show that, at the time of Cohen's (1962) study, 
nonparametric techniques were much more popular than they 
are now, while the use of multivariate techniques has 
increased substantially in recent years (Edgington, 1964, 
1974; Moore, 1975, 1981). Because the power 
characteristics of many nonparametric statistics were 
unavailable, Cohen (1962) substituted power estimates for 
the analogous parametric tests (e.g.,! test for the 
Mann-Whitney~ test). This procedure was not continued in 
the present survey for two reasons: (a) None of the power 
surveys conducted . after Cohen (1962) have continued the 
practice; and (.b) the infrequent use of most nonparametric 
statistics makes impractical the estimation of power even 
for those tests for which power characteristics have been 
investigated (e.g., Bennett 6 Underwood, 1970; Blair 6 
Higgins, 1980a, 1980b; Blair, Higgins, & Smitley, 1980). 
Published research reports do not provide convenient 
computing algorithms (i.e., algorithms not requiring 
integrations) for most nonparametric methods. Furthermore, 
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those sources which provide tables summarizing power 
functions for nonparametric methods are usually not 
extensive enough to meet the needs of a power survey. 
A similar situation exists for most multivariate 
statistical methods. In general, the power characteristics 
of multivariate methods are well-known, since these 
statistics are derived from the general linear model (e.g., 
Das Gupta & Perlman, 1974; Koichi, 1962; Kres, 1975/1983; 
Ramsey, 1982; Stevens, 1980). However, for the most part, 
neither convenient computer algorithms nor suitable power 
tables · are available for most multivariate tecbnigues. 
Furthermore, measures of multivariate effect size have 
received relatively little attention (Cramer & Nicewander, 
1979; Huberty, 1983; Sachdeva, 1983; Serlin, 1982; Shaffer & 
Gillo, 1974; Stevens, 1980). Thus, a researcher wishing 
to compute power for a multivariate statistic must be able 
to estimate the expected variance-covariance matrix. Most 
behavioral researchers are not in a position to be able to 
do this. 
Determination of Statistical Power 
Cohen•s (1977) tables were used to determine power for 
the following statistical tests: differences between 
correlation coefficients, sign tests, differences between 
proportions, and chi-square tests. The tables reguire 
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entries for sample size and effect size to retrieve power 
values. The tabled values are given to two decimal places 
and are accurate to about one digit in the last decimal 
place when compared to exact values. Two-tailed testing at 
alpha= .05 was assumed. 
Computer programs were written to expedite the 
determination of power for the remaining tests (t, ~ and 
F). This was done because of the frequency of occurrence 
of these statistics, and to avoid the interpolation errors 
inevitably encountered with the use of tables. All 
programs are interactive and were written in EASIC to run 
on an Apple II Plus microcomputer. 
The computer program to determine the power of a! test 
was based on the normal approximation to the noncentral ! 
distribution given by Cohen (1977). Since this formula 
assumes that sample sizes are equal, it was modified 
slightly to permit unequal B power calculations. The 
program reguires only the input of sample size to produce 
power estimates for the range of effect sizes to be studied 
(see section below) and for two-tailed testing at alpha= 
• OS. 
The determination of power for the Pearson correlation 
coefficient was based on the normal score approximation for 
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~ provided by the hyperbolic arctangent transformation, 
plus a correction factor for small sample sizes (Cohen, 
1977). This program also requires only the input of sample 
size to produce power estimates for the range of effect 
sizes to be studied and for two-tailed testing at alpha= 
.05. 
The cube root normal approximation of the noncentral 1 
distribution was employed for the analysis of variance 
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power program (Laubscher, 1960; Severo & Zelen, 1960). The 
accuracy of this formula has been found to be guite good, 
with errors appearing only ·in the 3rd or 4th decimal places 
for alpha= .OS (Pearson, 1960; Tiku, 1966). Although more 
accurate approximations exist (Barton, David, & O'Neill, 
1960; Han & Wang, i98J; Laubscher, 1960; Patnaik, 1949; Tiku, 
1965, 1966), their additional computational compleiity does 
not justify the gain in resolution. This program requires 
inputs for numerator and denominator degrees of freedom and 
for the associated critical (5%) 1 value to produce power 
estimates for the range of effect sizes of interest. 
For all three computer programs, the normal score 
approximation is converted to a probability (power) value 
using formula 26.2.19 in Abramowitz and Stegun (1965, p. 
932). The values produced by this algorithm agree with 
exact values given by Hawkes (1982) to five significant 
figures (as many as given by Hawkes) for~~ 3. Abramowitz 
and Stegun (1965) give the accuracy of the algorithm as 
±1.5 X 10-7 This level of accuracy is more than 
sufficient for present purposes. The resulting power 
values agree well with those given in Cohen's (1977) power 
tables. 
Range and Type of Effect Size Indices 
Power determinations were made for two sets of effect 
size range. One set of small, medium, and large effect 
size definitions was b a sed on those used by Cohen (1962) 
for comparison with the power results of that survey. The 
other set was based on the effect sizes given in Cohen 
(1969, 1977), £or comparison with the results of power 
surveys conducted after Cohen (1962). The indices of 
effect size and magnitudes of their ranges are given in the 
following sections for each of the statisti c s listed in 
Table 8. 
1. t test. The effect size index for student's! test 
is Cohen's d, the standardized difference ·between group 
means (Cohen, 1962, 1969, 1977): 
1 = (K1 - K~ / §, (3) 
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where ~1 is the mean of the first group, M2 is the mean of 
the second group, and§ is the common (pooled) standard 
deviation. ~ is related to delta, the noncentrality 
parameter for the noncentral ! distribution, as follows: 
delta= g * sgr(n/2) , (4) 
where~ is the sample size of each group. 
The definitions for small, medium and large effect 
sizes are (a) 0.25, 0.50, and 1.00, respectively, for 1962; 
and (b) 0.20, 0.50, and 0.80, respectively, for 1969. 
2. Pearson r. The effect size index here is simply the 
correlation coefficient itself. The definitions for small, 
medium, and large effect sizes are (~ .20, .40, and .60, 
respectively, for 1962; and (b) .10, .30, and .50, 
respectively, for J969. 
3. Differences between correlation coefficients. 
Cohen's (1962) original index was simply t1e difference 
between the two correlation coefficients. Because 
different correlations have different sampling variances, 
the detectability of equal differences is not constant 
throughout the range, but increases as~ approaches ±1. 
Thus, for a given sample size and alpha level, it is easier 
to detect the difference between r's of .6 and .8 than 
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between r•s of .2 and .4. Another disadvantage of this 
measure, in the context of a power survey, is that it 
requires the extraction of sample values to estimate the 
population correlation of the test, thus rendering the 
power of the test dependent on the results of the study. 
Cohen's (1962) procedure was to average the reported sample 
correlations, and to use this average as the population 
estimate in the power computations. small, mEdium, and 
large effect sizes were then defined as correlation 
differences from this average of .10, .20, and .30, 
respectively. 
Cohen (1969) offered a more convenient effect size 
indicator, q, based on the Fisher r-to-z transformation: 
q = l z ( 1) - z ( 2) I , (5) 
where z(1) and z(2) are the~ score equivalents of the two 
correlation coefficients. The~ score transformation of£ 
is given by 
~ = ln((1 + r)/(1 - r))/2, (6) 
or equivalently by 
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~ = arctanh(r) (7) 
Small, medium, and large values of 3 are .10, .30, and .50, 
r€spectively. These values will be used not only for the 
"1977" power survey but for the "1962" surv e y comparison as 
well, because of the difficulties noted previously 
concerning Cohen's (1962) original effect size procedure 
for differences between correlation coefficients. Since 
the frequency of occurrence of this statistic was very low 
(less than 1%), the departure from Cohen's (1962) earlier 
procedure should not affect the outcome of the 1962 survey 
comparision. 
4. Sign test. Here the effect size is simply defined 
as the departure of a proportion from .50: 
~=IE - . 50 I , 
where£ is the observed proportion. Small, medium, and 
large effect sizes were defined by Cohen (1962) as .10, 
.20, and .30, respectively, and b y Cohen (1977) as .OS, 
.15, and .25, respectively . 
5. Differences between proportions. A problem similar 
to that f or the test for differences between correlations 
confronted Cohen (1962) here. His solution was similar: 
(8) 
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effect size was defined as the simple difference between 
proportions. small, medium, and large differences were 
defined as .10, .20, and .30, respectively. Again, this 
solution is not very satisfactory, since different 
proportions have different sampling distributions. 
Constant differences between proportions are not equally 
detectable across the scale of proportions, but are easier 
to detect as the departure from .SO increases. Thus, the 
difference between proportions of .20 and .30 is easier to 
detect than the difference between .40 and .50. Although 
the magnitude of the differences are the same, .the former 
difference is "larger" with respect to the statistical 
power function. As before, Cohen's (1962) definition is 
dependent on the observed sample proportions, which were 
averaged to estimate the level of the population 
proportion. 
Eisenhart (1947) suggested the arcsin transformation to 
stabilize the variance and normalize the distribution of 
proportions: 
phi = 2 * arcsin (sgr (p)) , (9) 
where Eis the observed proportion. Cohen (1969) employed 
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this transformation to define an effect size index for 
differences between proportions. Since power is invariant 
over levels for differences in arcsins, a convenient index 
of effect size is 
h = I phi(1) - phi(2) I , ( 10) 
where phi(1) and phi(2) are the arcsin tran§£ormations for 
the two proportions. While this index is in common use 
(Feigl, 1978; Overall & Hornick, 1982; Ory. 1982), an 
equally common approach is to assume asymptotic normality 
for the untransformed binomial proportions (Dixon & Massey, 
1983; Fleiss, 1981; Fleiss, Tytun, & Ury, 1980; Runyon, 
1969; Ury & Fleiss, 1980). Both approaches work well in 
power approximations for a wide range of conditions 
(Hornick & Overall, 1980; Ury. 1981), excepting small 
sample sizes or proportions near zero or one (Haseman, 
1978) · . 
The primary advantage of the aicsin approach for a 
power survey is that only the order of magnitude of the 
difference between proportions need be specified, and not 
the individual magnitudes. Cohen (1977) defined small, 
medium, and large effect sizes as differences in arcsins of 
.20 •• so, and .80. respectively. These definitions will be 
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used for the 1962 power estimate comparisons as well as for 
the 1977 comparisons for the same reasons discussed for the 
~ score test for differences between correlation 
coefficients. 
6. Chi-sguare tests. The chi-square test for~ 
proportions (goodness-of-fit) and for£ x £ contingency 
tables presented the greatest problems for Cohen (1962). 
For the goodness-of-fit test, the effect size was defined 
as the ratio of the largest proportion to the smallest 
proportion, with the assumption that the remaining 
! - 2 proportions were distributed proportionately 
throughout the range. Ratios for small, medium, and large 
effect sizes were 3:2, 2:1, and 4:1, respectively. 
The definition of effect size, 1, was given by 
.! = sum((P(1i) - P(Oi)) 2 / P(Oi)), (11) 
where P(Oi) is the proportion in cell i expected under the 
null hypothesis, and P(1i) is the proportion in cell i 
expected under the alternative hypothesis. The sum is 
taken over all cells. Small, medium, and large effect 
sizes were based on the ratio of largest to smallest 
proportions, and assumed a proportional distribution 
throughout the range for the remaining cell proportions. 
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Thus, specific values of! vere not defined as small, 
medium, or large by Cohen (1962); these values varied 
according to the size of the contingency table, decreasing 
vith increasing table degrees of freedom. As with the~ 
tests for differences in correlations and in proportions, 
Cohen's procedure for chi-square produces effect sizes 
which are dependent on the nature of the experiment, are 
tedious to compute (and of course must be computed for each 
study), and most important, are not invariant over studies. 
For these reasons, Cohen's (1962) procedures for the 
chi-square test were no _t employed in this study. 
Cohen (1969) did not change his index of effect size, 
except to call it e instead of 1. He did, however, provide 
definitions for small, medium, and large effect sizes: .05, 
.10, and .20, respectively. Cohen (1977) changed the 
effect size index again, proposing the statistic v, where 
x = sgr(e) = sgr(l) • ( 12) 
xis related to lambda, the noncentrality parameter of the 
noncentral chi-square distribution: 
lambda= w2 * ! , ( 13) 
where j is the total sample size. 
Definitions of small, medium, and large effect size 
also changed, to .10, .30, amd .50, respectively. Note 
that these values do not correspond exactly to the square 
roots of the 1969 definitions. 
Because oft.heir convenience, Cohen's (1977) effect 
size index and magnitude definitions will be used for both 
the 1962 and the 1977 power survey comparisons. The 
departure from the procedures of his earlier survey should 
not greatly affect the results, since the frequency of 
chi-sguare tests in the survey was low (about 5%). 
7. F tests in the analysis of variance and covariance. 
The effect size index here is f, the standard deviation of 
the t standardized population means: 
.!. = s {m) / § , ( 14) 
where§ is the common (pooled) standar d deviation of the~ 
groups, and s(m) is t~e standard deviation of the means. 
That is, 
s {m) = sgr (sum ( (m (i) - m) 2) /k) , (15) 
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where m(i) is the mean of the ith group,~ is the grand 
mean, and k is the number of groups. For the two-group 
case, { is related to d, the effect size index for the! 
test, by 
! = g / 2 • (16) 
The index 1 is also closely related to phi, the 
noncentrality parameter of the noncentral l distribution 
introduced by Tang (1938): 
phi=!* sqr(n) , { 17) 
where~ is the sample size of each of the t groups. 
Furthermore, 1 is related to lambda* the noncentrality . 
parameter used by Patnaik ( 19 49) and others (Laubscher, 
1960; Severo & Zelen, 1960), as follows: 
lambda= f 2 * D * ~ (18) 
Small, medium, and large effect sizes were defined by 
Cohen (1962) as f's of .125, .25, and .SO, respectively. 
These definitions were modified by Cohen (1977) to .10, 
.25, and .qo, respectively. 
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8. F tests in multiple regression/correlation analysis. 
Cohen (1962, 1969) did not specifically deal with multiple 
regression analysis, but he did introduce the topic in his 
revised handbook (Cohen, 1977). For the most basic case of 
one variable predicted from a set of variables, Cohen 
(1977) suggested f2 as a measure of effect size: 
f2 = R2 / ( 1 - R2) , ( 19) 
where R2 is the squared multiple correlation coefficient, 
the proportion of variance in the dependent variable 
accounted for by the set of independent predictor 
variables. The index f 2 is the square of the effect size 
index! used in the analysis of variance and covariance. 
It is related to lambda, the noncentrality parameter for 
the noncentral 1 distribution, as follows: 
lambda= f2 * ~, {20) 
where 
~ - 1 (21) 
Here xis the error degrees of freedom,! is the total 
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sample size, and~ is the number of groups. 
Small, medium, and large effect sizes, in terms of f2, 
are defined as .02, .15, and .35, respectively. In terms 
of R2 these values are equal to .02, .13, and .26, 
respectively (cf. Table 4). 
Results 
A total of 166 articles were examined, 58 in the 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology (JAP), and 108 in the 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP). 
Twenty-four articles were excluded, 10 in JAP and 14 in 
JPSP. Thirteen articles contained no statistics at all, 
and 11 contained only statistics for which power was not 
determined [primarily data reduction techniques, such as 
principal component analysis and causal modeling 
procedures) • 
Power was determined for statistics reported in the 
remaining 142 articles: 48 in JAP and 94 in ~PSP. The 
total number of statistical tests for which power was 
calculated vas 3452, 1135 in ~AP and 2317 in JFSP. The 
frequency of occurrence for each test is given in Table 9. 
The sample is dominated by the "traditional" statistical 
tests: Pearson r, analysis of variance and covariance, and 
the 1 test, which constitute 90% of the reported 
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technigues. Because this tabulation necessarily excluded 
tests for which power was not determined, the listed 
frequencies can not fairly be compared to the results of 
surveys of the use of statistics in psychological research 
(Edgington, 1964, 1974; Hoyer, Baskind, & Abrahams, 1984; 
Moore, 1975, 1981). 
Table 9 
Frequency Distribution for Tests in Power Surv~i 
Statistical Test Freguency Proportion Cum. Prop. 
Pearson£ 1420 .411 • 411 
ANOVA/ANCOVA 1083 .314 .725 
! test 610 • 177 .902 
Chi-square 173 .050 .952 
Multiple Regression 127 .037 .989 
Difference between r•s 21 • 006 .995 
Difference between p's 1q .004 .999 
Sign test 4 .001 1.000 
Since the number of statistical tests appearing in each 
study varied greatly--from 1 to 152--the study was used as 
the unit of analysis. Thus, each article contributed 
equaJ.ly to the overall power assessment of the journal 
literature (following Cohen, 1962). The power of each 
study was determined by averaging across statistical tests. 
Six separate power estimates were made for each 
statistical test. Three estimates were based on Cohen's 
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(1962) original definitions of small, medium, and large 
effect sizes. These estimates were designated Sml62, 
Med62, and Lrg62, respectively, for convenience. A second 
set of three estimates was based on Cohen's (1977) "modern" 
definitions of effect size. These estimates were 
designated Sml77, Med77, and Lrg77. 
Essentially, then, two separate power surveys were 
conducted, one based on Cohen's original definitions of 
effect size, and one based on his more recent definitions. 
The results of these two surveys will be presented 
separately. Results were collapsed across journals, s~nce 
the differences in average power estimates between journals 
was never greater than ±.019. Averaging power estimates 
across experiments within studies, and averaging simply 
across all statistical tests (and ignoring studies) both 
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also produced results very close to those which are presented 
below. 
Power Results Based on "1962 11 Definitions 
Power estimates based on Cohen's (1962) original effect 
size definitions are shown in Table 10. For comparison, 
the results of Cohen's (1962) survey are also displayed. 
Power has increased for all levels of effect size. All 
increases were statistically significant: for small 
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effects, t(210) = 2.78, R < .01, omega 2 = .031; for 
medium-sized effects, t(210) = 3.18, p < .01, omega 2 = .041; 
for large effects, t(210) = 3.0q, p < .01, omega2 = 
• 037. 
Table 11 shows the percentage of studies with power 
less than .50 and less than .80 for both the 1982 studies 
and for Cohen's (1962) results. 
Power Results Based on "1977" Definitions 
Power estimates based on Cohen's (1977) revised effect 
size definitions are shown in Table 12. For comparison, 
the results of other recent power surveys (including all 
surveys listed in Tables 5, 6 and 7, except for Cohen, 
1962) are also displayed. Table 13 shows the percentage of 
studies with power less than .50 and less than .80 for both 
the 1982 studies and for the other recent power surveys. 
Discussion 
As shown in Table 10, power has increased since Cohen 
(1962) conducted his survey 20 years ago. Although these 
increases were statistically significant, the magnitude of 
the changes were modest (omega2•s < .05). Power for small 
effects remains very poor (.24), while power for large 
effects--already very good (.83) in 1962--is now even 
better (.89). 
Of greatest interest is the increase in power for 
medium-sized effects. Here power has increased about 20%, 
from .48 to .59. Unfortunately, this increase--though an 
encouraging sign--still results in less than a 60% chance 
of detecting a medium-sized effect. At this rate of 
increase, power for medium-sized effects will not reach .80 
for about 30 years! 
Another way of comparing these results to those 
obtained by Cohen (1962) is shown in Table 11. Here the 
percentage of studies with power less than .SO and less 
than .80 are shown as a function of effect size. Again, 
the most noteworthy changes are for medium-sized effects. 
Cohen reported that 57% of all studies obtained power of 
less than .50; this figure has now dropped to 38%. 
Of course, power of .50 should be generally 
unacceptable to most researchers and in most research 
situations. Cohen (1977) has recommended that researchers 
design their studies to achieve power of .80. At this 
level of power, the current design of research in JAP and 
JPSP is inadequate to detect all but large effects. Even 
so, 21% of all studies were unable to attain this level of 
power even for large effects. While there has been some 
improvement here for medium-sized effects, 74% of the 
studies surveyed failed to reach power of .80 for this 
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Table 10 
Average Power of 1982 Studies Compared to Cohen's (1962) 
Results: "1962" Effect Size Definitions 
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level of effect size. 
Power estimates based on Cohen's (1977) more 
recent--and smaller--effect size · definitions are naturally 
somewhat lower than pow~r estimates based on Cohen's (1962) 
original effect size definitions {see Tables 12 and 13). 
These ·results are generally consistent with the range of 
results obtained by other power surveys (shown in Tables 6 
and 7). In fact, average power for studies published in 
JAP and JPSP was on the average somewhat lower than for 
studies published in other behavioral journals. The common 
tendency to generalize to psychological research the 
inadequate power obtained by studies in other areas of 
behavioral research therefore seems to have been just~fied. 
The results oz these power surveys are not encouraging, 
whether power is based on the "1962" effect size 
definitions or on the "1977 11 definitions. While power may 
be adeguate if a large effect size is postulated, there is 
often no way to judge whether or not such an assumption is 
justified. Furthermore, surveys suggest that the average 
effect size in psychological research may be no larger than 
Cohen's definition of a medium-sized effect (Erown, 1975; 
Haase, Waechter, & Solomon, 1982), for which average power 
was less than .60. 
It might be argued that the power of behavioral 
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resear~h ■ust be adequate, since a large proportion of all 
studies published in behavioral research journals have 
reported statistically significant results (Greenwald, 
1975; Smart, 1964; Sterling, 1959). Unfortunately, not 
only does low power suggest that there may be a large 
number of type II errors in the behavioral research 
literature, low power also suggests the possibility of a 
proliferation of type I errors in .the research literature. 
Consider a researcher who conducts an investigation for 
which the null hypothesis ~s true. With effect size equal 
to zero, power will be equal to alpha, since there is no 
true alternative to detect. Should our unfortunate 
researcher (or more likely, other researchers) persist in 
conducting research i.n this area, in the long run 
significant results will occur at a rate of 5,, if alpha= 
.05. Many of these significant results are likely to be 
published, however, while the non-significant results will 
for the most part not be published, but rather will remain 
in 11file drawers" (Rosenthal, 1979), an indication of the 
bias against null results exhibited by journal editors 
(Bakan, 1966; Carver, 1978; Greenwald, 1975; Lykken, 1968; 
McNemar, 1960; Smart, 1964; Sterling, 1959; Tullock, 1959), 
reviewers (Atkinson, Furlong, & wampold, 1982; Fagley & 
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McKinney, 1983; Wampold, Furlong, & Atkinson, 1983), and 
the research community in general (Beauchamp & Kay, 1964; 
Rosenthal & Gaito, 1963, 1964; see also the related papers 
by Beyth-Karom, 1982, Cowles & Davis, 1982a, Lichtenstein & 
Newaan, 1967, Simpson. 1944, 1963, and Strahan & McGovern, 
1979). Thus, 100% of all published significant results 
will be type I errors, despite a type I error rate of .05! 
In this way, low power undermines the confidence which can 
be placed even in statistically significant results. 
While this situation is admittedly contrived, the 
situation with power greater than alpha but still low is 
not much better. When the power of research is low, the 
probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis may be only 
slightly smaller than the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis when the aiternative is true. That is, the 
ratio of type I errors to power may be uncomfortably large, 
indicating that a large proportion of all significant 
results may be due to false rejections of valid null 
hypotheses. In the extreme this leads to the degenerate 
situation described above. Nor is this situation unknown 
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to methodologists, many of whom have commented upon various 
aspects of the problem (Bakan, 1966; Cohen, 1965; Katzer & 
Sodt, 1973; Kunce, Cook, 6 Miller, 1975; Lane & Dunlap, 1978; 
KcNemar, 1960; Millman & Cieslak, 1970; Overall, 1969; 
Bosenthal, 1966, 1979, 1980b; Selvin & Stuart, 1966; 
Sterling, 1959; Tullock, 1959; ialster & Cleary, 1970), 
some going so far as to suggest that all published 
significant results may be type I errors! This may well be 




statistical Power and Artifactual controversy 
in Research on Spontaneous Recovery 
Limitations of Power surveys 
Most new techniques, and most new applications of 
existing techniques, receive their fair share of critical 
commentary. surveys of statistical power have fared well 
in this respect, since most comments have been favorable. 
The only exception has been the power survey conducted by 
Brewer (1972), which has been extensively criticized 
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(Cohen, 1973bi Dayton, Schafer, & Rogers, 1973i Meyer, 1974a, 
1974b). 
Brewer's (1972) power survey included a number of 
irregularities not repeated in other power surveys, which 
have stayed closer to the format introduced by Cohen 
(1962). Brewer erred in includi ng only statistically 
significant results in his survey (and specifically 
excluding nonsignificant results), in substituting~ for 
alpha in the determination of power, and most seriously in 
interpreting power as the probability of a valid rejection 
of the null hypothesis after a statistical test has been 
conducted. (Brewer, 1974, claims to have been 
misinterpreted.) 
Although not often criticized, power surveys do have 
inherent limitations. Since reporting of effect sizes is 
not a common publication practice, power estimates have to 
be based on a range of effect sizes. The range is supposed 
to be representative of the magnitude of effects in 
behavioral research. But extensive surveys of effect size 
magnitude have not been conducted, so that there is no way 
to assess whether or not the range of effect sizes used in 
power surveys does, in fact, characterize behavioral 
research. However, relatively limited, sma~l-scale 
assessments of obtained effect size generally do support 
Cohen's estimates, as previously mentioned (Brown, 1975; 
Haase, Waechter, & Solomon, 1982) • 
A second limiting aspect of power surveys is that all 
have concentrated on entire research areas, usually by 
analyzing all of the studies appearing in a specific 
journal {see Table 5). In Study I, for instance, research 
published in the Journal of Personality ~nd Social 
Psychology and in the Journal of Abnormal · Psychology was 
examined. The type of research published in such journals, 
and indeed in most journals, necessarily covers guite a 
broad range of topics. Thus, .even if it is admitted that 
the range of effect sizes on which power analyses are based 
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is generally accurate, the results of the power analyses 
are nevertheless strictly applicable only to an entire area 
of research. The most that can te said of the results of 
Study I, then, is that the power of social and abnormal 
psychological research in general is low. 
There is certainly nothing wrong with such a statement. 
Power surveys, as they have been conducted, have made an 
important (if largely ignored) contribution to the 
methodology of behavioral research. Yet the limitations on 
the interpretation of power surveys leave unanswered some 
interesting questions. What exactly does it mean to say 
that the statistical power of some very broadly defined 
area of research is inadequate? After all, knowing that a 
high type I error rate plagues a particular journal 
literature does not reveal which studies are type I errors 
and which are not! Furthermore, the impact of such 
knowledge is diffused across research in many specific 
areas, ultimately leading to the speculation that the 
accumulated impact of low statistical power on behavioral 
research may be similarly diffuse. 
More interesting might be a consideration of the 
statistical power of a specific area of research, that is, 
an area for which a specific research hypothesis has been 
clearly defined and o~erationalized. What would be the 
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consequences of inadequate statistical power in a specific 
research area? 
One important consequence might be the generation of a 
controversy concerning the existence of the phenomenon or 
treatment under study. This would be particularly likely 
to occur if, for the set of studies designed to detect the 
effect, the average power were approximately .50. The 
statistical power of such research would be inadequate to 
insure the detection of the effect in all studies, and yet 
sufficient to guarantee some significant results. 
Consider the following example. A researcher discovers 
that a one-hour training program increases scores on the 
Verbal section of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT-V) by 
50 points (SD= 100). Since this is a rather startling 
result, several other investigators wish to confirm the 
effect. A total of 10 exact replication s of the original 
study are conducted. In each replication, 50 subjects are 
given training, while an additional 50 subjects are used as 
controls. The test fo r stat i stical si g nificance for the 
differe nces in SAT-V scores between the treatment group 
after training and the control group is conducted at the 
. 01 level. Finally, assume also that the train i ng program 
really does work in the manner suggested in the original 
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study. 
What is the probability that any one of these 10 
studiEs will yield a statistically significant result? 
Since we are assuming that the training program does 
increase SAT-V scores, one might expect all 10 studies to 
result in statistically significant differences. This 
would be true if samples perfectly repreSEntative of the 
two populations could be drawn. In fact, sampling error 
will reduce the likelihood of obtaining a statistically 
significant result in any particular study. 
For the case described here, the resulting statistical 
power of a one-tailed 1 test at alpha= .01 is .55, that 
is, with a total of 100 subjects, the probability of a 
significant test result in any one study is only .55. 
Thus, if all ten studies were conducted, it might be 
expected that only five or six of the studies would yield 
significant results, even assuming that the training 
program works to the extent described. Whether or not one 
obtained a significant result would be dependent on 
sampling error. It is easy to understand how controversy 
over the effectiveness of the training program might 
develop under these circumstances. 
Although the situation described in the example is, of 
course, contrived, it does not seem implausible, especially 
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given the low power of behavioral research indicated by 
power surveys. Whether or not similar situations have 
actually arisen during the conduct of behavioral research 
is the question Study II was designed to answer. 
The substantive topic to be considered is the 
"spontaneous" recovery of previously extinguished or 
"unlearned" verbal associations. Spontaneous recovery 
occupies a critical position in the interference theory of 
memory (Underwood & Postman, 1960), yet the issue of its 
existence has long "enjoyed" controversial status. The 
traditional approach to the study of spontaneous recovery 
is the standard (A-B, A-C) retroactive interference design. 
Within this design, spontaneous recovery is demonstrated by 
the significant interaction of time (retention intervals) 
and groups (interference vs. control group). 
Analysis is accomplished through the straightforward 
application of a two-factor fixed-effects between-groups 
analysis of variance. Unfortunately, the critical 
interaction of groups by time has not always yielded 
significant results. During the period of its most 
intensive study {1948-1969), approximately 40 studies were 
published on spontaneous recovery, with roughly equal 
numbers of significant and nonsignificant results. The 
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ambiguity in the analysis of variance results has led to 
the conclusion in most texts and reviews that the evidence 
for spontaneous recovery is not convincing (e.g., Baddeley, 
1976; Crowder, 1976; Keppel, 1968; Klatzky, 1980; Postman, 
Stark, & Fraser, 1968; Postman & Underwood, 1973). Some 
researchers have blamed the analysis of variance itself, 
and have suggested alternative analytical procedures 
(Brown, 1976; Coleman, 1979). The effect is often 
considered ephemeral, and the issue has not been resolved 
so much as it has been abandoned. 
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Lively debate on a controversial issue is often 
regarded as a healthy sign; in many areas of scientific 
research, conflicting findings generating such debate often 
precede major theoretical advance (Kuhn, 1970). 
Unfortunately, this may not always be the case in the 
behavioral sciences, where dependence on statistical tests 
to establish the existence of an effect renders the 
research vulnerable to the statistical power of those 
tests. 
study II examined the statistical power of the research 
which has been conducted on spontaneous recovery. Such an 
analysis requires the specification of the magnitude of the 
spontaneous recovery effect. One approach to this problem 
would be to estimate power for a range of effect sizes, as 
in Study I and in previous power surveys. Although this 
was done, a more appropriate procedure is possible, one 
which has not yet been employed in connection with power 
analysis. The magnitude of the spontaneous recovery effect 
was estimated for each study and an average effect size was 
calculated. This average was then used as the effect size 
estimate in the power analysis. Procedures for the 
cumulation of effect sizes across studies--collectively 
known as meta-analysis--are described in the ~ethod 
section. 
Although this approach is quite simple, previous 
researchers seem not to have considered it. The most 
likely reason for this failure is the emphasis of previous 
power studies on the survey of research results, the big 
picture, as it were. The advantages and disadvantages of 
this approach have already been discussed. The scope of 
the research topics covered in a power survey is 
necessarily broad and it may well be meaningless to speak 
of an "average" effect size, since averages characterize 
heterogeneous populations poorly. 
122 
There are difficulties with the approach that will be 
attempted here. As with previous power surveys, the chief 
technical difficulty lies in the estimation of effect size. 
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Although ■any writers have called for the increased use of 
effect size estimates in published research reports (Bakan, 
1966; Carver, 1978; Cohen, 1965, 1977; Cowles, 1977; Craig, 
Eison, & Metze, 1976; Dwyer, 1974; Hays, 1963, 1981; Vaughan 
& Corballis, 1969), the inclusion of such estimates 
in journal articles is still not a common practice. As the 
resolution of this problem is also primarily technical, its 
discussion will be deferred to the Method section. 
At least two additional difficulties need to be 
discussed. First, it might well be argued that studies on 
spontaneous recovery do not constitute a homogeneous set, 
and therefore an average effect size should not be 
computed. Strictly speaking, this point is correct, since 
the set of studies are clearly not exact replications •. 
However, this criticism is more important from a 
theoretical than a methodological standpoint. For example, 
one obvious design feature which might affect effect size 
is the length of the retention interval. If there is a 
relationship between effect size and retention interval, 
then it would be clear that spontaneous recovery studies 
could not be considered to yield a homogeneous set of 
effect sizes. such a relationship would have important 
theoretical implications concerning the nature of 
spontaneous recovery. 
From the standpoint of statistical power, however, any 
relationship between effect size . and retention interval, or 
any other design characteristic of spontaneous recovery 
research. becomes relatively unimportant. Ordinarily. even 
this assertion could be challenged, but for the fact that 
the existence of spontaneous recovery has been questioned 
in general. That is. the controversy surrounding 
spontaneous recovery is not whether it can be demonstrated 
at one retention interval and not another, but whether it 
can be demonstrated at all. Thus, it makes sense to 
estimate the power of spontaneous recovery research in 
toto, since it is the adjudged failure of spontaneous 
recovery research as an entire research domain which has 
led researchers to question the existence of the 
phenomemon. 
The final difficulty is perhaps less subtle than the 
last and concerns the problem of publication bias, that is, 
the tendency of significant results to be published while 
nonsignificant results are not (Atkinson. Furlong. 6 
wampold, 1982; Bakan, 1966; smart, 1964; Sterling. 1959). 
Cohen (1962) has pointed out that, poor as the results of 
his survey were, the actual statistical power of research 
m-ust be even worse, since publication bias insures that 
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only the most powerful research (i.e., that most likely to 
produce significant results) will be published, and thus 
available for inspection. 
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Although some meta-analysts have essentially dismissed 
the problem of publication bias (e.g., Smith, 1980), others 
have provided some procedures for assessing the potential 
impact of publication bias on meta-analysis (e.g., Dawes, 
Landman, & Williams, 1984; Kurosawa, 1984; Orwin, 1983; 
Rosenthal, 1979, 1980b). As discussed previously (see 
Chapter 2), Lane and Dunlap (1978) have shown that 
publication bias may greatly distort reported effect size 
estimates. Although their results have limitations (most 
notably in that they did not consider sample sizes larger 
than 20), their results are nevertheless disturbing. While 
they do not draw from their research any lessons for 
meta~analysis, the implications are clear: effect sizes 
cumulated across studies may seriously overestimate 
population effect size. Curiously, the Lane and Dunlap 
(1978) study seems not to have made any impact on 
practitioners of meta-analysis: a quick survey of journal 
articles, conference presentations, books and book chapters 
on meta-analysis and effect size estimation written after 
1978 revealed only a single reference (Green & Hall, 1984) 
to the Lane and Dunlap (1978) results--among 250 works! 
Publication bias should not be a problem for Study II 
for two reasons: (a) It is expected that the overall effect 
size for spontaneous recovery research will be so small 
that overestimation will be inconseguential for practical 
purposes (i.e., the difference between 1% and 2% of 
accounted for variance is small even if one is 100% larger 
than the other). Furthermore, an inflated effect size will 
not materially affect the interpretation of results if the 
resulting estimate of statistical power is low (e.g.,< 
.60). (b) A large proportion of spontaneous recovery 
studies reported nonsignificant results (hence the 
controversy) so that the effects of publication bias on 
effect size estimation · are likely to be greatly diminished, 
though undoubtedly some publication bias is likely to be 
present in this literature, especially during the early 
years of the research. 
Method 
Selection of Studies 
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Research on spontaneous recovery began with the studies 
by Underwood (1948a, 1948b). Such a well-marked origin is 
convenient, as it provides a point of departure for a 
bibliographic search. Two general indices were searched 
for references to spontaneous recovery: Psychological 
Abstracts and Social ~cience ~itation Index. In addition, 
11 journals which publish research on human learning and 
memory were searched exhaustively: America! Journal of 
Psychology, Bulletin 2~ the Psychonomic Society, Journal of 
Experimental Psychology._ Journal of Psychology& Journal of 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior. Memory & Cognition, 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, Psychological Record, 
Psychological Reports, Psychonomic Science. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental gilchol.2,gL_ 
The goal was to include as many studies as possible in 
the analysis. To this end, studies listed in Dissertation 
Abstracts and in conference proceedings were also included 
in this research. The primary disadvantages of these 
sources are that (a) abstracts frequently provided 
insufficient information for meta-analysis and power 
analysis, and (b) the sources themselves were often not 
readily available. Inclusion of studies from these sources 
should, however, help reduce the effects of publication 
bias. 
A total of 40 spontaneous recovery studies conducted 
between 1948 and 1979 were discovered. These studies 
contained 48 separate experiments. ~ost of the studies 
were retrieved from the published research literature (n = 
35). The remaining sources were divided between 
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dissertations (n = 3) and con£erence proceedings (n = 2). 
A list of the 40 studies included in the analysis is given 
in the Appendix. 
Procedures for Meta-Analysis 
Meta-analysis is a term coined by Glass (1976a, 1976b, 
1977) t o r e fer to the quantitative synthesis of results 
from ■an y separate studies, usually in conjunction with an 
otherwis e traditional literature review. Although the term 
is nev and the technique has enjoyed great popularity in 
the pas t f ev years, meta-analysis is more accurately 
describ d a s a collection of procedures. Most of the basic 
procedur e s have been known f or many years. 
Meta-ana l ysis may be useful for answering two basic 
questions of a series of independent studies: (a) Is there 
statistical support for the research hypothesis? (b) If so, 
what is the magnitude of the effect? Procedures designed 
to answer the first question may be described generally as 
significance tests on the results of separate studies. The 
unit of analysis is the study itself, and the data analysed 
may b€ the probability level attained by the separate 
significance tests, or the significance test values 
themselves, or some transformation of these. Procedures 
designed to answer the second question are essentially 
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equivalent to averaging the effect size results of the 
sepa r ate studies. 
Significance level. Procedures for assessing the 
overall level of statistical support for an effect are most 
useful when the results of some studies have been 
statistically significant while the results of other 
studies have not. Since this is precisely the situation 
for spontaneous recovery research, the first step in the 
meta-analysis of this literature was to summarize the 
statistical evidence for the effect. 
Rosenthal (1978, 1980b, 1982) and Hunter, Schmidt, and 
Jackson (1982) have described various techniques suitable 
for summarizing significance levels. Perhaps the simplest 
and most generally useful technique is the "method of 
adding~ scores" (Rosenthal, 1978): 
~ = sum (z (i)) / sqr (N) , (22) 
where~ is the normal score associated with the overall 
level of significance, z(i) is the normal score associated 
with the probability level attained by the significance 
test for the ith experiment, and J is the number of 
experiments included in the analysis. Although simpler 
than other combining procedures, the method of adding~ 
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scores nevertheless gives results in good agreement with 
the results of other techniques, such as the well-known 
Fisher (1932; Winer, 1971) chi-square method for combining 
probabilities. 
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The method of adding~ scores requires a knowledge of 
the exact value o£ the test statistic and its associated 
degrees of freedom so that a~ score corresponding to the 
significance level (p) attained by the test statistic can 
be determined. A problem encountered here was that the 
value of the test statistiG was not given in 13 of the 
experiments which reported nonsignificant results. For 
these studies a~ score of zero was assigned, even if the 
direction of the results supported an interpretation of 
spontaneous recovery (Rosenthal, personal communication, 24 
July 1980), as was frequently the case. Finally, if the 
results of an experiment were opposite to that predicted by 
the hypothesis of spontaneous recovery, a negative~ score 
was recorded. This occurred infrequently (for three 
studies and for four experiments). 
Average effect size. Given the overall significance of 
the accumulated~ scores, meta-analysis proceeds by 
computing an average effect size for the research 
literature. Since effect sizes are rarely reported, they 
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generally have to be estimated for each experiment. The 
most convenient effect size measures for analysis of 
variance designs are the proportion of accounted for 
variance statistics, eta 2 and omega 2 • Eta 2 was used in the 
present study since it is somewhat easier to compute for 
factorial designs than omega 2 and is more easily related to 
the noncentrality parameter (lambda) of the noncentral 1 
distribution, thus facilitating subsequent power 
calculations. Furthermore," both eta 2 and omega 2 give very 
similar results when, as expected in this study, the 
magnitude of the effect is small. 
Eta-squared is easily computed from the 1 statistic and 
degrees of freedom for the significance test of spontaneous 
recovery. For a two-factor design, Haase (1983) gives the 
following: 
df (AB) F (AB) 
eta 2 (AB) = --------------------------------------------df (A) F (A) + df (B) F (B) + df (AB) F {AE) + df (E) 
, 
(23) 
where df(A), df(B), df{AB), and df(E) are the degrees of 
freedom for factors A and B, the interaction AB, and the 
error term, respectively, and F(A), F(B), and F(AB) are the 
1 ratios obtained for factors A and Band for the 
interaction, respectively. 
One problem freguently encountered in using equation 23 
was that the value of nonsignificant I ratios were often 
not reported. In this case, Cohen's (1977) f was computed 
using the reported means and standard deviations of the 
groups (see equations 1q and 15). Cohen's twas then 
converted to eta2 using the following relationship: 
eta2 = £2 / (1 + f2) • 
In some cases no information at all was given about the 
spontaneous recovery effect except that it was not 
statistically significant. When this occurred an effect 




Using the average effect size estimate as the 
alternative, power was calculated for each experiment based 
on the degrees of freedom for the significance test of 
spontaneous recovery which was used in the original 
analysis. Power calculations were based on the cube root 
normal approximation of the noncentral f distribution 
(Laubscher, 1960: Severo & Zelen, 1960), as previously 
described for Study I. Power was also computed for each 
study using Cohen's (1977) definitions of small, medium, 
and large effect size (f = .1, .25, and .4, respectively). 
These effects account for 1, 6, and 14 percent of the 
variance, respectively. All power computations were 
performed with alpha= .05. Four power estimates were thus 
obtained for each experiment. These estimates were then 
averaged across eiperiments to obtain summary power 
estimates. Thus, the experiment (not the study) was used 
as the unit of analysis. 
Results 
Meta-Analysis 
Significance level. Equation 22 was used to determine 
the overall level of significance for the spontaneous 
recovery effect. The z score for the combination of all 48 
experiments was large {z = 8.333, ~ < .001). Because . 
visual inspection suggested that larger s~udies tended to 
produce more nonsignificant results, the combined z was 
recalculated with weighting based on sample size 
(Rosenthal, 1978). The resulting~ was only slightly 
smaller (z = 8.063). The use of three other combining 
methods given by Rosenthal (1978) produced similar results 
(testing the mean p, testing the mean z, and the Fisher 
chi-square procedure). 
Since only 48 experiments were included in the 
analysis, the results may be vulnerable to the "file 
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drawer" problem (Rosenthal, 1979). That is, because 
significant results are more likely to be published than 
nonsignificant results (which have been filed away), 
significant results may be overrepresented in the 
calculation of equation 22. Although this is often a 
problem in ■eta-analysis, it may not be in the case of 
spontaneous recovery. Since 28 of the 48 experiments (58%) 
reported nonsignificant results, there seems to have been 
no hesitancy to report such findings. (Indeed, the opposite 
case might be made for the reporting of nonsignificant 
results, a "bandwagon" effect!). 
Rosenthal (1979) has provided quantitative procedures 
for estimating the tolerance for a combined set of studies 
for unpublished or future null results. That is, how many 
null results must be filed away to reduce the level of 
significance indicated by equation 22 to just greater than 
the .05 level? This can easily be determined by 
rearranging terms in equation 22, solving for N, and 
subtracting a constant (equal to the number of studies 
which are known to exist). The resulting "fail-safe" 
number for spontaneous recovery experiments is 1184. The 
likelihood of there being that many unpublished null 
spontaneous recovery results seems remote. 
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Magnitude of the effect. Not surprisingly, no direct 
estimates of effect size were reported in any spontaneous 
recovery study. More disturbing, however, was that many 
studies did not provide sufficient data for post hoc 
estiaation of effect size. Although the ·I test results for 
significant interaction (spontaneous recovery) effects were 
almost always given, 1 test results for main effects 
frequently were not given, even when these were 
significant, since these tests are usually of no interest. 
Thus, it was often not possible to use equation 23. 
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Use of a reduced equation, including only the 
interaction and error terms of equation 23, was considered 
but not used. This would have been equivalent to computing 
partial eta-squared (Cohen, 1973a). In general, this 
solution would be satisfactory, since the unreported X 
ratios are usually not significant. Thus, such 1 ratios 
would be small relative to the error degrees of freedom, 
and so would exert only a small influence on the 
denominator in equation 23. Unfortunately, this procedure 
was not practical in the present case since the main 
effects of a spontaneous recovery design (differences in 
recall between groups and across retention intervals), 
though usually of no interest, are almost always large. 
Thus, estimating partial eta-squared would have greatly 
over-estimated the magnitude of the spontaneous recovery 
effect. 
Most surprising was that many studies did not report 
even the most basic descriptive statistics. While group 
means were almost always reported, standard deviations 
frequently were not. Thus, even Cohen•s i statistic could 
not be computed for many experiments. It is interesting to 
note that 75% of the spontaneous recovery studies were 
published in two of the most respected journals of 
experimental psychology: the Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbai Behavior and the Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
In all, there were only 10 experiments for which effect 
size could be determined. Since several experiments 
contained more than one estimate, a total of 19 effect size 
estimates were obtained. These estimates were averaged 
within experiments first, and then averaged across 
experiments. The resulting average proportion of variance 
accounted for (eta 2 ) was .032. 
Power Analysis 
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All power estimates were based on 45 experiments, since 
there was no indication of sample size in three of the 
experiments. Power was computed for each experiment using 
the average effect size etaz = .032 as the alternative 
hypothesis. Alpha was assumed to be .OS for all studies. 
Average power across experiments vas .375. 
Power was also computed for each experiment assuming 
Cohen's definitions of small, medium, and large effect 
sizes as the alternative hypotheses. These results are 
shown in Table 14 and are reported separately for 
experiments which obtained significant spontaneous recovery 
effects and for experiments in which the spontaneous 
recovery effect was not significant. 
Table 14 
Average Power of SFontaneous Recovery Studies 
Significance 
Result 
p < .OS 


















Note. ~ is the number of experiments in each 
significance category. 
Discussion 
Spontaneous recovery has been a controversial 
phenomenon for 20 years. Meta-analysis and power analysis 
of spontaneous recovery studies suggests, however, that 
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this controversy may, at least in part, be artifactua1. 
The results of the meta-analysis show that the spontaneous 
recovery effect is "real" (that is, statistically 
significant), but that the effect is small. The average 
proportion of variance accounted for was .032, somewhat 
smaller than Cohen's (1977) definition of a medium-sized 
effect. Of course, Cohen was mainly speaking of research 
in the "softer" areas of psychology when he defined effect 
sizes. Thus, for a laboratory research phenomenon, the 
magnitude of the spontaneous recovery effect is indeed 
small. 
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The estimate of effect size f or spontaneous recovery is 
best regarded cautiously, since it was based on data from 
only 10 experiments. Furthermore, only two (20%) of these 
studies reported significant results, compared to about 40% 
for the entire set of spontaneous recovery studies. Thus, 
it is possible that these results underestimate the size of 
the spontaneous recovery effect. Nevertheless, the 
magnitude of the effect probably does not exceed Cohen's 
definition for a medium-sized effect. 
These results indicate that the "inconsistency" 
attributed to the analysis of variance interaction may be 
due to the emphasis reviewers have placed on the level of 
significance attained by individual studies, rather than 
that attained by the entire series of spontaneous recovery 
studies. In fact, these results demonstrate that the 
interaction test has provided convincing support for the 
existence of spontaneous recovery. 
It may seem surprising that such large~ scores were 
obtained when less than half of the experiments produced . 
statistically significant results. However, many of the 
nonsignificant outcomes were in the direction predicted by 
the hypothesis of spontaneous recovery. Brown (1976) was 
one of the few reviewers of the spontaneous recovery 
literature who concluded that there was sufficient evidence 
for the effect. By relying ■ore on the direction of 
results rather than on actual statistical outcomes for a 
series of studies, Brown's conclusions more nearly resemble 
those of a meta-analysis than a traditional review of the 
literature. Brown's approach is not a typical procedure 
among behavioral researchers, who are more apt to be 
influenced by the proportions of significant and 
~onsignificant results in a research literature (counting 
noses, according to M€ehl, 1978). Brown's approach, and 
that of meta-analysis in general, is more in the spirit of 
Platt•s (1964) strong inference, which emphasizes 
converging lines of e ·vidence. Since the evidence for 
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spontaneous recovery has been considered weak by most 
reviewers (including Bossi, 1977), the results of this 
analysis seem to support the findings reported by Cooper 
and Rosenthal (1980) that the use of statistical methods of 
summarizing research results will shov more support for an 
hypothesis than vill traditional reviewing methods. 
Based on the obtained estimate of effect size, power 
was computed for each experiment. The average power for 
the entire set of spontaneous recovery studies was low. 
This is not surprising, gi~en the small size of the effect. 
Moreover, the average power estimate of .375 agrees well 
with the actual proportion of experiments which obtained 
significant results: .417 (20 of 48 experiments significant 
at p < .05). 
Table 14 shows the results of a tttraditional" power 
survey of the SFontaneous recovery literature~ It is clear 
from these results that the power of spontaneous recovery 
studies is inadequate to detect all but large effects. 
Even if, as previously suggested, the obtained effect size 
underestimates the magnitude of the spontaneous recovery 
effect, it is unlikely that the effect is as large as 
Cohen's (1977) large effect size, which accounts for 14% of 
the variance. More reasonable would be to assume a 
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medium-sized effect for spontaneous recovery. The average 
power of the spontaneous recovery experiments to detect 
medium-sized effects was .611. 
Although the power of spontaneous recovery research is 
low, it is adequate to insure that at least some studies 
will obtain significant results. It is easy to see how 
controversy over the existence of the effect might develop 
under these circumstances. This is especially so for 
spontaneous recovery, since it is unlikely that researchers 
in this field ever seriously considered the issue of 
statistical power, either a priori or in the evaluation of 
null results. As a laboratory endeavor, it was probably 
assumed that sufficient control of the experimental 
situation would be all that was necessary to elucidate the 
effect. Small effects are unusual in laboratory studies of 
human learning and memory, so that the issue of statistical 
power is generally not raised. 
The average sample size of research in spontaneous 
recovery was about 80, somewhat larger than research i n 
other areas of psychological research (Holmes, 197 9 ; Holmes 
et al., 1981). If the magnitude of the spontaneous 
recovery effect is as small as suggested by the results of 
this study, then even larger sample sizes would be required 
in any future research. Of course, it is important to 
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remember that small'er sample si2es would also have avoided 
the controversy, since the effect would rarely have been 
detected. This point is important, since the null 
hypothesis is never exactly true. Thus, researchers should 
be able to compute the power of their studies, not only to 
detect the effect they seek, but also to avoid detecting a 
· trivially small effect. 
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The critical question for spontaneous recovery 
researchers is, How small an effect should be considered 
unimportant? What constitutes a small effect is admittedly 
something of an arbitrary decision. If the goal of 
research is prediction or classification, then effects even 
as large as Cohen's large effect si2e may contribute very 
little information (Hyde, 1981; Rossi, 1983). If the goal 
of the research is theoretical then even a small effect, in 
Cohen's sense, may be an important starting point for 
future research. As the research continues, improvements 
in understanding the phenomenon under study should lead to 
more sensitive experimental tests, thus increasing the 
effective magnitude of the effect. This process has worked 
well in tbe physical sciences, where the investigation of 
small effects is a routine business (see Chapter 6). 
Since spontaneous recovery occupied a critical position 
in the interference theory of forgetting (Underwood & 
Postman, 1960), it may be that even a small effect would 
have been worth pursuing. Instead, the issue of 
spontaneous recovery seems to have faded away slowly during 
the 1970s, a fate not uncommon to theories in the "soft" 
areas of psychological research (Meehl, 1978), but unusual 
in laboratory research. In .current textbooks on human 
lear ning and memory the interference theory of forgetting 
is still a popular topic. However, that aspect of the 





Inadeguate Statistical Power and Artifactual 
Controversy in Psychological Research 
The purpose of study III was to generalize the findings 
of Study II. Since spontaneous recovery is not the only 
research literature which is plagued with inconsistent 
findings, the role of statistical power in other research 
domains was investigated in Study III. Meehl (1978) has 
noted . that many th eories in "soft" psychology fade away 
when researchers lose their enthusiasm as inconsistent and 
unreplicable results accumulate. That this outcome is not 
limited to social and clinical research is evident from the 
fate of spontaneous recovery. 
One problem with conducting many power analyses such as 
that done in Study II is the necessity of also performing 
the prerequisite meta-analyses to determine the average 
effect size. such meta-analyses are very time-consuming, 
since the literature must be searched exhaustively, and 
effect sizes then computed for every study. Furthermore, 
such an endeavor almost always requires the participation 
of a subject matter expert. 
Fortunately, a great number of meta-analyses have been 
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published in recent years. Many, though by no means all, 
of these have been conducted specifically because of the 
inconsistent state of a particular research literature. 
Use of already published meta-analyses is particularly 
advantageous in that the literature searches have already 
been conducted and the effect size calculations have 
already been made. 
Method 
Selection of Meta-Analyses 
The search for meta-analyses was conducted using the 
subject indices of Psychological Abstracts and Social 
Science Citation Index. In addition, several journals 
which typically publish review articles were examined 
exhaustively, including the American Educational Research 
Journal, American PsychologistL Journal gi Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, Journal Qi Educational Psychology, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Personality 
and Social Psycholrn Bulletini PsycholQ,gical BulletinL 
Review of Educational Research. Journal searches commenced 
with the 1978 volumes. The reference lists of recently 
published books on meta-analysis were also examined (Glass, 
McGaw, & Smith, 1981; Hunter, Schmidt, & Jackson, 1982; 
Rosenthal, 1980a). 
A total of 95 meta-analyses published between 1977 and 
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1984 were discovered. The distribution of sources was as 
follows: 81 journal publications; 5 book chapters; 4 
conferenced presentations; 4 unpublished manuscripts obtained 
from the authors; and 1 book. The most popular publication 
outlets were Psychological Bulletin and the Review of 
Educational Research. 
To be suitable for power analysis, a meta-analysis must 
provide certain minimum information. In particular, sample 
size and effect size information must be listed for every 
primary study included in the meta-analysis. These data 
are required for power to be estimated for each study. 
Unfortunately, most of the meta-analyses (n = 89 = 94%) did 
not give both sample size and effect size for each study 
inciuded in the analysis. In fact, most of the 
meta-analyses did not report any individual study results. 
Instead, only average effect size and its correlation with 
suspected moderator variables was usually reported (e.g., 
Landman & Dawes, 1982; Smith & Glass, 1977; Willson & 
Putnam, 1982). This situation seems some~hat ironic, since 
meta-analyses are themselves dependent on full reporting of 
data in the primary studies. 
The remaining six meta-analyses included five published 
in research journals and one unpublished manuscript. The 
results of 17 separate meta-analyses were given in the six 
reports, since several reports included the results of more 
than one meta-analytic review. Of these 17 meta-analyses, 
four were excluded because they were conducted on research 
areas of minimal controversy: more than 80% of their 
constituent primary studies reached similar conclusions 
(i.e., more than 80% or fever than 20% of the primary 
reports obtained statistically significant results). 
Finally, one additional meta-analysis was deleted because 
it included data from only four primary studies. The 
remaining 12 meta-analyses were based on a total of 215 
studies and 160122 subjects. A list of these meta-analyses 
and the substantive research area reviewed is shown in 
Table 15. 
Procedures for Meta-analysis 
All 12 meta-analyses used Cohen's (1977) gas the index 
of effect size. Average effect size reported in each 
meta-analysis was not used as the basis for power 
estimates. This was not done because several authors used 
questionable techniques for averaging effect sizes. In 
particular, several authors simply omitted from the effect 
size calculations primary studies for which Cohen's g could 
not specifically be computed. 
For the present study, Cohen's g was estimated based on 
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Table 15 
Meta-Analyses Included in Study III 
Source 
Arkin et al. (1980) #1 
Arkin et al. ('1980) t2 
Arkin et al. (1980) 13 
Burger (1981) 
Cooper (1979) 11 
Cooper (1979) #2 
Hall (1978) #1 
Hall (1978) 12 
Hasenfeld (1983 ) 
Hyde (1981) #1 
Hyde {1981) t2 
Hyde (1981) 13 
Area Reviewed 
Self-serving attribution bias: 
Teacher-student paradigm 
Self-serving attribution bias: 
Client-therapist paradigm 
Self-serving attribution bias: 
Miscellaneous paradigms 
Defensive-attribution bias 
Gender differences in conformity: 
Asch-type experiments 
Gender differences in conformity: 
Fictitious norm groups 
Gender differences in decoding 
nonverbal cues: Visual 
Gender differences in decoding 
nonverbal cues: Auditory 
Gender di fferences i n aggrression 
Gender differences in verbal 
ability 
Gender differences in quan ti ta ti ve 
ability 




the reported significance level obtained in the primary 
study. For example, if Cohen's g was not reported, but the 
study was listed as reporting no significant results, a g 
score of zero was assigned. If instead, a significance 
level was reported, then the lowest g value which would 
have resulted in that significance level, based on the 
reported sample size of the study, was assigned. In some 
cases, both Cohen's g and another index of effect size 
(such as omega2) were reported in the meta-analysis. When 
Cohen's g was not given but the other measure was, t hen 
Cohen's g was determined by deriving equations relating the 
two measures of effect size. Recomputation of effect size 
also provided a check on the calculations in the reported 
meta-analysis results. Thus, the average effect size 
reported for meta-analyses here might differ from those 
reported by the original authors. 
Power Analysis 
Using the average effect size as th e alternative to 
detect, power was computed for each study in each 
meta-analysis. These power estimat e s were then avera ged 
for each meta-analysis. 
A "traditional" power survey of each meta- analysis was 
also conducted. For each study power was estimated using 
Cohen's (1977) definitions of small, medium, and large 
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effect size as the alternative hypotheses. (Small, medium, 
and large effect sizes were defined by Cohen, 1977, as g = 
0.2, 0.5, and 0.8, respectively, accounting for 1%, 6%, and 
14% of the variance (eta2), respectively.) Averages were 
then obtained for each level of effect size by averaging 
across studies within meta-analyses. Thus, four power 
estimates were obtained for each primary study, three based 
on Cohen's definitions of small, medium, and large effect 
sizes, and one based on the average effect size found for 
the particular meta-analysls in which the primary study was 
reported. All power estimates assumed alpha= .OS. 
Results and Discussion 
The paver analysis results for each of the 12 
meta-analyses is given in Table 16. Also shown for each 
meta-analysis is the average effect size and the proportion 
of primary studies which obtained statistically significant 
results (p < .05). If the conflicting findings reported in 
a meta-analysis are due to inadequate statistical power, 
then it may be expected that the average power for the 
meta-analysis should be a reasonably good estimate of the 
proportion of studies which resulted in significant 
effects. These results are given in the last two columns 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Although an indication of the concordance of these two 
measures for the entire set of meta-analyses is really of 
only secondary importance, it is interes t ing to note that 
the correlation is fairly good (r = .904). The correlation 
seems especially good since the ends of the distribution 
were eliminated, that is, the low controversy studies. For 
these studies power and significance rate were either both 
high or both low, and their inclusion would have inflated 
the correlation. 
Another way to assess the relationship between power 
and significance rate for the entire s e t of meta-ana l yses 
is given by a comparison of the average power to the 
overall proportion of significant results. These figures 
were very similar: the average power for all 215 studies 
was .397, while the proportion of all primary studies 
obtaining statistically significant results was .400. 
Although these results are sugg estive, global 
assessments of the relationship between power and 
significance rate suffer the same disadvanta ges as 
traditional power surveys: results are collaps ed across 
disparate research areas, and thus may not be readily 
generalizable. More appropriate is a consideratio n of the 
power results for each meta-analysis separately, for this 
will give an indication of the extent to which the case of 
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spontaneous recovery is an isolated one. For six of the 
meta-analyses the correspondence between the power estimate 
and the significance rate seems reasonably good (Arkin, 
Cooper, 6 Kolditz, 1980, #3; Cooper, 1979, t1; Hall, 1978, 
11; Hasenfeld, 1983: Hyde, 1981, #1 & 13). For two of the 
remaining meta-analyses power was substantially lower than 
significance rate (Cooper, 1979, 12; Hall, 1978, 12). This 
outcome is not too surprising, since significant results 
are more likely to be published than nonsignificant 
results. 
For the four remaining meta-analyses power was greater 
than significance rate (Arkin et al., 1980, 11 & 12;Burger, 
1981; Hyde, 1981, #2). Thus, for these four areas 
of research inadequate statistical power cannot completely 
account for the existence of conflicting findings. This is 
especially true for three of these meta-analyses, for which 
power ranged from .754 ~o .895. These are substantial 
levels of power and should be satisfactory for most areas 
of behavioral research. Controversy in these areas may be 
due to any of a number of possible sources: different 
methodologies or measuring instruments, differential 
failure to control extraneous sources of error, 
incompatible operational definitions, conflicting 
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theoretical orientations, etc. It should be noted, 
however, that for one of the four meta-analyses {Burger, 
1981) power, although much higher than significance rate, 
was still guite low (.420), so that the influence of 
inadeguate power in this area of research cannot be ruled 
out. 
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of these results 
is that for only three of the 12 areas of research can 
inadeguate power be ruled out as a source of the 
conflicting findings. For the remaining areas, inadequte 
power appears to be at least partially responsible for the 
conflict, although only further research within each 
specific area can determine whether there are yet 
additional sources contributing to the existence of the 
conflicting findings. 
Primarily responsible for this poor state of affairs 
are the magnitudes of the effects being investigated. As 
shown in Table 16, average eff e ct size across all 
meta-analyses was only .278 (Cohen's d). The average 
proportion of variance accounted for is .019! These are 
small effects indeed, and it should not be surprising that 
there may be difficulties in demonstrating significant 
relationships in these research areas. In no case, 
however, was statistical power me ntioned in these 
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meta-analyses as a potential source of the conflict. This 
is in spite of the fact that meta-analysts are, in general, 
more aware of statistical issues than most other behavioral 
researchers. In fact, increased statistical power is often 
given as one of the primary reasons for cumulating results 
across studies. 
The small effect sizes characteristic of these 
meta-analyses is emphasized by the results of the 
"traditional" power survey shown in Table 17. Here it can 
be seen that the power of the primary studies in these 
meta-analyses is higher than the power obtained in 
previously conducted power surveys. Especially noteworthy 
is that the average power for detecting medium-sized 
effects is .707, compared to .61 for other power surveys 
(see Table 6). The results shown in Table 17 might suggest 
that the power of the studies in these meta-analyses is 
good. However, as has already been pointed out, the actual 
average power for the primary studies is much lover, only 
.397! This is a good indication of the limitations 
inherent in traditional power surveys: the range of effect 
sizes suggested by Cohen (1977) are simply not very likely 
to be characteristic of the actual effect sizes in any 




Power surveys of Meta-Analyses 
Effect Size 
--------------------------
Meta-Analysis Small Medium Large 
----------------------------------------------------
Arkin et al. (1980) t1 .152 .631 • 941 
Arkin et al. (1980) #2 .139 .589 .930 
Arkin et al. (1980) #3 .126 .509 .836 
Burger ( 1981) .213 .792 .960 
Cooper (1979) #1 • 216 .744 • 952 
Cooper (1979) #2 .194 • 703 .942 
Hall (1978) #1 .299 .101 • 871 
Hall (1978) #2 .221 • 7 31 • 943 
Ha se nfeld C,983) • 130 .523 .848 
Hyde ( 1981) #1 • 567 .852 .959 
Hyde ( 1981) #2 .666 .938 .989 
Hyde (1981) t3 .128 .482 .792 
----------------------------------------------------
Averages .298 .707 .906 
---------------------------------------------------
In fact, Table 17 shows that the power of two 
meta-analyses was excellent. Hyde's (1981) 11 and #2 
meta-analyses had power values of .567 and .666, 
respectively, to detect small effect sizes. Median sample 
sizes for the primary studies in these meta-analyses were 
528 and 620, respectively. Thus, it is understandable why 
inadequate statistical power was never suggested as a 
problem. Yet, the effect size for Hyde's first 
meta-analysis was so small (d = .166, eta2 = .007) that 
average power was still quite low {.502). 
The results of Study III should not be interpreted to 
mean that all, or even most, conflicting findings in 
behavioral research are due to inadequate statistical 
power. Certainly there may be many reasons why the results 
of various studies do not agree: variations in subject 
characteristics, or in test administrations, for example. 
It is even for such reasons that the effect size under 
investigation may be small in the first place--lost in the 
noise of uncontrolled extraneous factors. Nevertheless, in 
many areas of scientific research, conflicting findings 
generate lively debate, and often precede major theoretical 
advance (Kuhn, 1970). Unfortunately, this does not seem to 
be the case in the behavioral sciences, where dependence on 
statistical tests to establish the existence of an effect 
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renders the researcher vulnerable to the power of those 
tests, a consideration freguently ignored. Some of the 
reasons for the differences between the behavioral sciences 
and the physical sciences are explored in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Behavioral and Physical - Sciences compared 
It has been said that true science does not need 
statistics. It is doubtful that many scientists believe 
this statement. Certainly even a casual reading of such 
major journals as science and Nature reveals that the 
behavioral sciences are not the only disciplines which use 
statistical tests and statistical inference. 
In fact, it is evident that the behavioral sciences do 
not even have a monopoly on small effect sizes. One 
example is the anomalous advance of the orbit of Mercury, 
discussed at the end of Chapter 2. Another, perhaps 
quintessential example is that the total amount of energy 
from outside the solar system ever received by all the 
radio telescopes in the world is less than the energy of a 
single falling snowflake (Sagan, 1980) ! The following 
examples are from recent issues of Science. 
159 
1. Raup and Sepkoski (1982) reported a decline in the 
extinction rate of families of marine life over the past 
600 million years. Their regression r 2 was .22 after major 
extinctions (outliers) were removed. Quinn (1983) 
reanalyzed their data and reported a regression r 2 (for all 
data points) of .07 if a normal model for eitinction rates 
was assumed and an r2 of .16 if a log-normal model was 
assumed. 
2. Harvey, Prabhakaran, Mao, and McCammon (1984) 
conducted a computer simulation study of the lengths of 
hydrogen bonds in phenylalanine transfer RNA. They stated 
that the lengths of these bonds "should be highly 
correlated (emphasis added) as the bases move away from one 
another. This is confirmed by the positive coefficients 
for bonds in adenine-uracil (AU) pairs and for neighboring 
bonds in guanine-cytosine (GC) pairs" (p. 1190). The 
correlations (not r2•s) foi the seven AU pairs ranged from 
-.23 to .35, with an average correlation of .17 (SD= .21). 
For the 25 adjacent GU pairs correlations ranged from .07 
to .70, with an average correlation of .36 (SD= .19). The 
average correlations were not reported by the authors. 
3. Cranston et al. (1984) have recently reported that 
the parasite~ falciparum reduces the ability of red cells 
to recover their normal shape after deformation by shear 
fluid stress. Time to recover for 70 normal cells was 121 
msec (SD= 29) and for 70 infected cell vas 137 msec (SD= 
36). This difference was statistically significant: t(138) 
= 2.896, ~ < .005. The authors did not report the 
proportion of variance accounted for by their results: 
omega2 = .05. 
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Examples of the use of statistics in physics--the 
hardest of the "hard" sciences--are a bit more difficult to 
come across. No recent issues of Science, Nature, or the 
Proceedings of 1he National Academy Qf Science§ included 
any physics reports which used statistical hypothesis 
testing procedures of the kind that would be familiar to 
behavioral scientists. However, an interesting example of 
hypothesis testing in physics was recently discussed by 
Franklin (1981). 
In the 1960s physicists conducted an intensive search 
for new elementary particles. The criterion for the 
establishment of a new particle was three standard 
deviations (i.e., E < .0027) above the background noise. 
Several particles reported in the literature could not be 
confirmed by subsequent research. The problem of "fal.se 
alarms" was solved when the required significance level was 
increased to four standard deviations (p < .000064}. The 
behavioral scientist will recognize the problem as that of 
the inflated type I error rate following m·ul tiple 
comparisons! 
Significance testing of the sort familiar to behavioral 
researchers is rare in the physical sciences. One is much 
more likely to encounter simple descriptive statistics, 
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such as the mean and standard error, in most physical 
science journals. Why is this? The answer has to do with 
the different roles played by theory in the physical and 
behavioral sciences. 
In the behavioral sciences theories are usually weak, 
and so are only able to make simple predictions: an effect 
is predicted to exist or not to exist. In contrast, 
theories in the physical sciences are typically so powerful 
that they are a~le to predict the magnitude of the effect 
that is being sought. In the behavioral sciences it is 
often sufficient to establish one's hypothesis simply by 
rejecting the null hypothesis. However, since no precise 
alternative is predicted, rejecting the null hypothesis is 
consistent with an infinite number of alternative 
hypotheses! Furthermore, as has frequently been pointed 
out by methodologists, the null is a straw-man hypothesis, 
since the a priori probability of its being exactly true is 
vanishingly small (Bakan, 1966; Meehl, 1967, 1978). 
In the physical sciences it is not sufficient to reject 
a null hypothesis: results must be consistent with (i.e., 
not significantly different from) theoretical predictions. 
A recent series of experiments in quantum mechanics is 
particularly illustrative. Since its development in the 
1920s quantum mechanics has been very successful in 
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predicting the behavior of matter at the atomic and 
subatomic levels. Unfortunately, certain predictions of 
quantum theory conflict with expectations based on two 
cherished assumptions of physical theory: (a) locality--the 
premise of the special theory of relativity that 
information cannot be transmitted faster than the speed of 
light, and (b) rea.lism--the idea that physical systems have 
well-defined properties whether they are measured or not, 
that is, that such properties are independent of human 
observation. 
To avoid the uncomfortable philosophical implications 
of quantum mechanics, physicists have proposed a class of 
theories known as local hidden variables theories. These 
theories postulate that the probabilistic character of 
quantum mechanics is not due to the indeterminateness of 
nature, but instead is simply an emergent feature of the 
operation of unknown (hidden) variables. If these 
variables could be revealed, physical theory would once 
again become deterministic. 
Aspect, Grangier, and Roger (1981) tested certain 
predictions of local hidden variables theory against those 
of quantum mechanics. The quantity delta was predicted to 
be less than zero by hidden variables theory and to be 
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0.058 ± 0.002 by quantum mechanical theory. The observed 
result was 0.0572 ± 0.0043, violating the prediction of 
hidden variables theory by more than 13 standard 
deviations, but in good agreement with the quantum 
mechanical prediction. Similarly, the quantity~ was 
predicted by hidden variables theory to be between -1 and 
0, and by quantum theory to be 0.118 ± 0.005. The obtained 
result was~= 0.126 ± 0.014. 
Subsequent attempts to confirm these results using more 
refined techniques were successful. In one such experiment 
the quantity~ was predicted by local hidden variables 
theory to be between -2 and · 2 and by quantum mechanics to 
be 2.70 ± 0.05. The observed result was 2.697 ± 0.015 
(Aspect, Grangier, & Roger, 1982). The violation of hidden 
variables theory was 46 standard deviations! The obtained 
results agreed well with the quantum mechanical prediction. 
In yet a third series of experiments~ was again predicted 
to be between -1 and Oby hidden variables theory (Aspect, 
Dalibard, & Roger, 1982). The prediction of quantum 
mechanics was 0.112. The obtained result was~= 0.101 
±0.020. 
What is particularly remarkable about these 
experiments--from the standpoint of the behavioral 
scientist--is not only the extent to which the predictions 
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of one theory are rejected, but also the degree to which 
the data agree with the predictions of the alternative 
theory. So good are these results that the graph captions 
included in these papers must point out that the displayed 
functions are predicted and have not been fit to the 
plotted data points! Not surprisingly, these studies are 
considered to be responsible for the death of local hidden 
variables theories (Rohrlich, 1983). (The reader 
interested in the philosophical implications of these 
results should consult d'Espagnat, 1979, Robinson, 1982, 
1983, and Rohrlich, 1983.) 
It is the degree of accuracy and precision in 
measurement, perhaps more than anything else, that gives 
physical science its enormous advantage and success, 
compared to the other sciences, in revealing small effects 
(Pipkin & Ritter, 1983). The example given at the end of 
the last section--the advance of the perihelion of 
Mercury--provides a good illustration. The magnitude of 
the effect is very small, but the deviation from the 
inverse sguare law that was proposed to account for the 
anomalous advance had to be rejected because the revision 
produced an unacceptably large deviation when applied to 
the known orbit of the Moon (Roseveare, 1982). Thus, it 
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was the precision with which the Moon's orbit was known 
that allowed a prediction about the orbit of Mercury to be 
rejected. 
Although the remarkable precision of the physical 
sciences may seem out of reach for the behavioral sciences, 
it should be encouraging to note that the statistical 
procedures used to confirm and reject predictions in the 
physical sciences are really no different, conceptually, 
from those used in the behavioral sciences. These 
procedures are essentially the acceptance and rejection of 
null and alternative hypotheses (although one might well 
quibble concerning which is which). The real difference in 
procedure between the physical and behavioral sciences lies 
in the insistence by physical scientists that one 
prediction be confirmed while the other is rejected. 
Again, it is the difference in the role played by theory 
that gives the physical scientist the advantage. 
This advantage can be exploited in ways that the 
behavioral scientist can not normally be expected to 
follow. Physical theory has resulted in certain 
predictions which may seem, superficially, to be strange: 
for example, that the force of gravity has been weakening, 
or that the solar constant has been decreasing. There is 
no evidence for these speculations, other than that, if 
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true, certain other anomalous conditions may be accounted 
for. The respect for physical theory is strong enough so 
that such predictions are not dismissed without some 
consideration and, if possible, test. 
In some cases, physical theory is stretched to the 
limit, unable to predict a magnitude for the size of an 
effect. Two of the strangest predictions of quantum theory 
are of this sort: (a) that the photon does not have a rest 
mass of zero, as is usually assumed, but has instead a very 
small, though finite, mass; and (b) that the proton is not 
stable, but has an extremely long, though again finite, 
half-life. In both cases, specific predictions of mass and 
half-life, respectively, can not be made. However, the 
regard for quantum theory is great enough so that 
considerable time and money _have been expended to detect 
the effects. All such attempts have so far failed. Rather 
than conclude that these effects do not exist, however, 
physical scientists have simply concluded that, if they do 
if fact exist, these effects must be smaller than a certain 
magnitude, that magnitude being determined by the error of 
measurement in the relevant experiments. 
In both cases the limits are guite impressive. For the 
rest mass of the photon the upper bound is 8 X 10-• 8 gram 
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(Davis, Goldhaber, & Nieto, 1975; Goldhaber & Nieto, 1976). 
For the proton, the upper limit on half-life is more than 
10 3 0 years (Weinberg, 1981). Ironically, the situation is 
not so dissimilar to one which freguently occurs to the 
hypothesis-testing behavioral scientist: failure to reject 
the null hypothesis! The behavioral scientist in this 
situation often asserts, incorrectly, that there is no 
effect. The physical scientist simply assigns an upper 
bound on the magnitude of the effect, and leaves a decision 
on the existence of the effect to future research. 
The behavioral scientist who has estimated statistical 
power for a range of possible effect sizes is in a position 
somewhat similar to that of the physical scientist. In 
this situation, as illustrated in Table 3, the behavioral 
scientist has had to consider the possibility that the 
sensitivity of the planned experiment may not be great 
enough to detect the effect. One of the most important 
results of a consideration of statistical power, then, may 
be that attention is focused on effect size as a kind of 
signal-to-noise ratio. A decrease in noise results in a 
more effective signal. Thus, effect size need not be 
thought of as a fixed and immutable guantity that we strive 
to detect. Instead, behavioral scientists should realize 
that effect size may be effectively increased through 
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increased measurement accuracy (noise reduction). The 
notion of a "population effect size" is thus really 
meaningless, though it may serve as a convenient fiction as 
an aid in the determination of statistical power. 
The emphasis on effect size as a signal-to-noise ratio 
may be the single most important lesson that the behavioral 
sciences can learn from the physical sciences, or for that 
matter, from statistical power analysis. The physical 
sciences have achieved an impressive record in discerning 
small effects by combining strong theory with highly 
precise measurement techniques. The real success of the 
physical sciences is in effectively increasing the 
signal-to-noise ratio, essentially making effect sizes 
larger. Among the behavioral sciences, only in the area of 
psychophysics has this idea been well established, though 
largely through a route independent of statistical paver 
analysis (i.e., signal detection theory). 
Many of the previously discussed examples of small 
effects in the physical sciences are not really small at 
all, at least not in the sense usually held by behavioral 
scientists. superficially, of course, such effects are 
small, in much the same way that a virus is small. 
However, such effects as the anomalous advance of Mercury's 
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orbit are easily discernable when sufficiently precise 
measurement techniques are applied to the problem. 
The degree of measurement accuracy that physical 
science can bring to bear on a problem is many orders of 
magnitude greater than that available to behavioral 
scientists. Perhaps this difference in technical ability 
is responsible for the different roles played by theory in 
the physical and behavioral sciences. These roles have 
been described briefly already. But there is a difference 
in these roles that is especially indicative of the 
approaches to science developed by physical and behavioral 
scientists. 
Although theories are weak in the behavioral sciences, 
there is considerable emphasis in behavioral research to 
fit research results into some sort of theoretical 
framework. The pursuit of purely empirical research is 
frowned upon and such work has trouble getting published. 
Empiricism is highly regarded in the physical sciences, 
wherein it is generally recognized that one of the basic 
problems of science is to make things measurable (Lenzen, 
1938). It may seem paradoxical, but in the physical 
sciences theory is not nearly so highly regarded as in the 
behavioral sciences, even though theories in the physical 
sciences are much more powerful and have been much more 
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successful than theories in the behavioral sciences. 
The reason for this is that physical scientists regard 
theories with skepticism, as candidates for rejection. 
Theories are made specific and thus easy to falsify. 
Empiricism is highly regarded because measurement provides 
the raw data with which to put theory to the test. 
Theories are not {or should not be) regaxded too highly, 
since the ultimate fate or all theories is to be discarded. 
The situation is clearly different in the behavioral 
sciences, as Meehl (1967, 1978) has noted. Good theories 
are difficult to construct, and there is a natural 
reluctance to let go in the face of "mere facts." Thus, 
one finds much ad hoc explanation and reconstruction to 
salvage theory. Successful theories in the physical 
sciences must undergo increasingly difficult tests to 
survive (Popper, 1959). The opposite seems generally to be 
true · in the behavioral sciences. The result in the 
physical sciences is that successful theories become 
extrememly strong and precise as they survive repeated 
attempts at falsification. Unsuccessful theories are 
continually replaced by stronger candidates. In the 
behavioral sciences successful theories discourage any 
attempt at falsification by incorporating whatever aspects 
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of their competitors that are necessary to survive. such 
theories are able, eventually, to tolerate almost any 
outcome of experimental test, especially given the nature 
of the statistical hypothesis testing procedure. Their 
fate is to slowly fade away, without clear-cut rejection, 
or even replacement, as researchers lose interest in the 
problem and move on to other matters (Meehl, 1978). 
The lessons for psychology are clear. In the face of 
low statistical power for the effects of interest, it is 
not sufficient to increase sample sizes. An attempt to 
make effect sizes larger is also necessary. This can be 
done by increasing measurment accuracy through the use of 
more effective measurement models, more sensitive 
experimental designs, and more sophisticated statistical 
techniques (e.g., multivariate methods, causal modeling, 
time-series analysis, etc.)~ construction of theories 
which make specific predictions concerning the magnitudes 
of effects would also be desirable. This will not be easy 
to do, since it will require a fundamental change in the 
nature of psychological theorizing. It is a goal 
psychologists should seriously contemplate. 
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CHAPTER 7 
summary of Findings 
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The statistical power of psychological research was 
examined in three studies. Study I provided a general 
assessment of statistical power in psychological research. 
All of the studies using statistical tests in the 1982 
issues of the Journal Qf Abnormal Psychol.QgY and the 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (N = 142) were 
evaluated and compared to the results of a previous survey 
(Cohen, 1962). Power was computed against small, medium, 
and large effect size alternatives. Results indicated that 
the power of psychological research has increased over the 
past 20 years. Power to detect small effects has increased 
from .18 to .24. Power to detect medium-sized effects has 
increased from .48 to .59, and power to detect large 
effects has increased from .83 to .89. Although all 
increases were statistically significant (p < .05), the 
magnitudes of the changes were relatively small, and did 
not affect the characterization of statistical power in 
psychological research. Power for small effects is still 
very low, and power for large effects is still very good. 
Power to detect medium-sized effects showed the largest 
increase. Although this is an encouraging trend, power for 
medium-sized effects is still not particularly good. 
The results of Study I are limited because accurate 
estimates of effect size, on which power analysis must be 
based, are not given in most research reports. Although 
Cohen's (1962, 1977) suggested definitions of small, 
medium, and large effect sizes are useful, there is very 
little evidence to suggest that these definitions are 
characteristic of psychological research. Furthermore, the 
results of power surveys are based on heterogeneous sets of 
research articles, since all of the studies appearing in 
entire journal issues are included in the analyses. 
In Studies II and III recently devised techniques of 
meta-analysis were used to provide estimates of effect size 
for subseguent power analyses. Use of these procedures 
permitted power analyses to be conducted using precise 
estimates of effect size, rather than a wide range of 
effect sizes, as in previous power surveys. 
In Study II, a meta-analysis of the research on the 
spontaneous recovery of verbal learning was conducted. A 
total of 40 studies (including 48 experiments) conducted 
between 1948 and 1979 were included in the analysis. This 
area of research was selected because previous studies of 
spontaneous recovery have produced conflicting results 
concerning the existence of the phenomenon. Results 
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indicated that the evidence for spontaneous recovery is 
statistically significant, but that the magnitude of the 
effect is small (eta2 = .032). A power analysis was then 
performed on the spontaneous recovery studies using the 
effect size information obtained by the meta-analysis. 
Results indicated that the power of research on spontaneous 
recovery was low. Moreover, the average power estimate of 
.375 agreed well with the actual proportion of experiments 
which obtained significant results: .417 (20 of 48 
experiments significant at -~< .05). 
The results of Study II suggest that the inconsistent 
findings reported in the spontaneous recovery literature 
may be an artifact of the low statistical power that 
characterizes this research area. This implication was 
examined further in Study III. Power analyses were 
conducted on each of 12 published meta-analyses, all of 
which had been performed on research literatures 
characterized by inconsistent results. The results of 
Study II were generally confirmed. For six of the 
meta-analyses statistical power was similar to the 
proportion of significant results. In only three of the 
meta-analyses was power relatively high (> .75), while for 
the remaining meta-analyses power was very low (< .55). 
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The low power of these research areas is due to the 
smali size of the effects that are being investigated. 
Average effect size (eta 2 ) across all meta-analyses was only 
.019. For effects of this magnitude only very large sample 
sizes will yield acceptable levels of statistical power 
(e.g., .80). It is recommended, therefore, that psychologists 
increase power by making effect sizes larger, that is by 
increasing the signal-to-noise ratio of research designs. 
Ultimately desirable is the construction of "strong" 
theories, which would enable researchers to make specific 
predictions concerning the magnitudes of the effects they 
study. 
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